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ABSTRACT
In the wake of breakthroughs in biotechnology and prosperous
development in the biotechnology industry, the field of biomedical
upstream research has experienced a large increase in the number of
patents granted This Article concerns mainly the threat that the
proliferation of upstream patents pose to biomedical research and
commercialization, especially the danger posed by research tool patents.
The propagation of research tool patents may impede access to those
research routes that are most promising to scientists. These patents also
create substantial burdens, including research delays and financial costs,
for independent researchers seeking authorization for the use of research
tools. There are two contending camps-the prospect theorists and the
anticommons theorists-arguing over the influence of patents on
biomedical upstream research. Although the anticommons theory is more
sensible and coherent, the reality of biomedical science does not unfold as
predicted by this theory. Empirical studies suggest that the reason for this
disparity lies in the nature of biomedical research, as well as in the
informal research exception that the scientific community has developed
However, even such empirical findings cannot convincingly negate all of
the problems created by upstream patents, including blockages in
downstream development and increasing delays and costs for follow-on
research on the patented upstream inventions. In this article, I review
proposals now put forward by scholars for eradicating these problems.
Finding fault with most of the resolutions proffered thus far, I argue for a
compulsory license system that charges reach-through royalties, which
are measured by the contribution that patented research inputs make to
the individual research. This is a method that can calibrate royalties to the
actual value of these research inputs. With this proposal, I hope to bridge
the gap between patentees and independent researchers so as to alleviate
the problems that biomedical science suffers now.
This article draws heavily on the author's dissertation for an S.J.D. degree at Indiana
University School of Law-Bloomington. Special thanks to Professor Yvonne Cripps,
the author's faculty advisor, and Professor Marshall Leaffer and Professor Kevin
Emerson Collins, for their encouragement and valuable suggestions throughout the
course of writing.
Assistant Professor of Law, National Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan. S.J.D.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of breakthroughs in biotechnology and prosperous
development in the biotechnology industry, the field of biomedical
upstream research has experienced a large increase in the number of
patents granted. The relaxation of patent laws, particularly with regard to
the requisite conditions for patentability, has also contributed to the
proliferation of upstream patents, which is having a negative impact in a
number of realms.1 The first threat of this proliferation is to the ideals of
open science and the free exchange of creative ideas. The prospect of
having to apply for patents is causing an increasing number of researchers
to keep their excellent ideas secret at least until the patent application is
filed. Their industrial partners or sponsors may also require them to do so.
The second threat of the patent proliferation is to follow-on research and
commercialization of patented inventions, especially the danger posed by
research tools. Research tools are those research inputs that are not
embodied in the final outcome of the research, yet are useful in
performing the research. The propagation of research tool patents may cut
off the routes of research that scientists find most promising. It also
generates substantial burdens, including research delays and financial
costs, for independent researchers when they seek authorization from the
patentees.
At the theoretical level, there are two contending camps arguing
over the influence of patents on biomedical upstream research. The
prospect theory camp emphasizes the incentives that early patenting may
provide for upstream innovation and downstream research and
development. The anticommons theory camp, however, stresses that
patent proliferation gives rise to the anticommons. The anticommons is a
set of situations where too many rights exist for excluding the use of an
object, and no privilege exists for anyone to overcome those rights and
make use of the object.2 The core problem with the anticommons is
underuse. It generates high transaction costs, triggering heterogeneous
strategies and agendas among various stakeholders, thus obstructing the
licensing of upstream patents and constraining follow-on research and
development in the field of biomedical research.3
After examining the literature on both sides, I conclude that the
anticommons theory is more sensible and coherent than the prospect
theory. The reality of biomedical science, however, does not unfold as
predicted by the anticommons theory. There is another camp of literature
that does not deny the theoretical possibility of the anticommons, but
rather concentrates on exploring the actual landscape of biomedical
1 See infra Section ll.B.
2 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
31d.
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upstream innovation.4 Scholars in this circle assert that the anticommons
has not occurred in biomedical science because of the nature of
biomedical research and because the scientific community has developed
"working resolutions," such as the informal research exception. As a
consequence, these scholars suggest that though possible in theory, the
negative impacts of upstream patents might not occur in reality. The
empirical studies of this camp are helpful to recognizing the true
conditions present in today's biomedical research. But they cannot
completely rule out the problems created by upstream patents, including
blockages in downstream development and increasing delays and costs for
research and innovation ensuing dependent on the patented upstream
inventions.
Using these existing studies as a foundation, this Article goes on to
identify the real problems that are occurring in the biomedical sector and
the need for coping with them. The author then reviews resolutions
already put forward by scholars for settling these problems. Finding fault
with most resolutions proffered thus far, this Article argues for a
compulsory license system, a solution that originates with Janice Mueller.5
I further refine this proposal and add new facets to it, such as ex post
notification and interpleader. The compulsory license system is in essence
a time-shifting mechanism, requiring independent researchers to pay
reach-through royalties at the end of their research for the patented inputs
they used therein. This system retains the chief virtues of the informal
research exception now operating in academia, empowering researchers to
use whatever input they need for their research, except for those inputs
that require assistance from the patentees. Reach-through royalties are
measured by the inputs' contribution to the research at issue, which
calibrates the royalties to their true value in individual research. By doing
so, this resolution can hopefully bridge the gap between patentees and
independent researchers that is now permeating at the license negotiation
stage, hence alleviating the delays and costs thus incurred.
This Article will embark on the above issues step-by-step. The
next Part analyzes the proliferation of upstream patents, including its
causes and resulting dangers. Part III summarizes and assesses the debate
between the prospect theory and anticommons theory camps. Part IV
further explains why the prediction of the anticommons theory has not
generally come true in biomedical science and points out where the real
problems lie. Part V reviews important resolutions proffered thus far on
this topic and discusses their respective deficiencies. Part VI argues for a
compulsory license system bearing reach-through royalty fees and
examines its compatibility with the World Trade Organization's (WTO)
Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
4 See infra Section IV.B.
5 Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception
to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REv. 1 (2001).
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("TRIPS Agreement"), a primary international patent agreement with
prevalent membership. Finally, in Part VII, this Article concludes that the
inflexibility of the current patent system may sabotage the fulfillment of
the compulsory license system. Regaining latitude for reform is thus the
first step on the path to improving our patent system.
II. BIOMEDICAL UPSTREAM PATENTING AND ITS PROBLEM
There has been a tendency towards patenting research outcomes in
the biomedical sector since the landmark case Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
6
in which the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed the patentability of living
organisms for the first time. Though biomedical and other kinds of
biotechnology patents are not necessarily granted for living creatures, this
decision trumpeted a surge of application and issuance in biotechnology
patents.: The number of biotechnology patents issued by the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) increased rapidly in the 1990s, starting at
fewer than 1000 in 1990 and rocketing to its high watermark of 5977
patents granted in 1998. In the following years, the number of patents
issued fluctuated and then declined after 2001. In 2004, the PTO granted
4324 biotechnology patents, about the same level as that in 1997.8
Biomedical patents have expanded not only quantitatively, but also
towards the research upstream. A growing number of patents on gene
sequences illustrates this trend. According to the statistics from the
Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), by the end of 2001, the PTO
had granted at least 6500 patents covering gene and open reading frame
sequences. 9 Of these patents, at least 1300 are on human genetic materials.
Thus far more than 20,000 patent applications for gene sequences have
been submitted to the PTO. 10 This means that more upstream patents may
be still on the way.
6 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
7 Biotechnology patents conventionally include two major divisions: biomedical patents
and bio-agricultural patents.
8 David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics. The Mismeasure of
Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1677, 1687, 1731 fig.1
(2007). For the reason behind the high tide of biotechnology patents in 1998, see infra
text accompanying notes 16 25; for the reason behind their decline thereafter, see infra
Section IVA.
9 Open reading frame sequences are DNA sequences that may bear genetic codes for
proteins and are usually located in a gene initiation codons and termination codons.
Open Reading Frame, in Online Medical Dictionary, available at
http://cancerweb.ncl.ac.uk/cgi-
bin/omd?query-open+reading+frame&action-Search+OMD; Wikipedia, Open
Reading Frame, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open readingframe (last visited Apr.
24, 2008).
10 Biotechnology Industry Org., Primer: How Many Patents has the PTO Issued Covering
Gene Sequences?, http://www.bio.org/ip/primer/genesequences.asp (last visited Apr.
28, 2008).
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A. THE REASON FOR EXPANSION IN UPSTREAM PATENTING
The prosperity of the biomedical industry in recent decades and its
science-based nature are the primary reasons for the upstream patenting in
the biomedical sector. In academia, there used to be a disinclination to
secure patents for scientific discoveries. This was derived from the notion
that scientific findings should be open to humanity for employment,
evaluation, and extension.11 The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 materially altered
this academic ethos. The Act enabled public-funded researchers to file and
own patents for their specific findings. 12 This change of law spread the
practice of patenting and licensing scientific discoveries, which had
previously existed in only a few universities, such as Stanford University
and University of California, to academic institutions across the nation. 13
Changes in patent law are another reason for the increase in biomedical
upstream patenting. In addition to the expansion of subject matter that the
Supreme Court articulated in Chakrabarty, courts have also relaxed the
requirement of utility. The Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson 4_a
1966 case about an allegedly novel process to produce certain known
steroid-set aside the traditional standard that simply required the
patented invention to be more than frivolous and insignificant and laid
down the modern rule for the utility requirement:
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution
and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the
benefit derived by the public from an invention with
substantial utility. Unless and until [an invention] is refined
and developed to this point-where specific benefit exists
in currently available form-there is insufficient
justification for permitting an applicant to engross what
may prove to be a broad field. 15
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 182 (1987).
12 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211, §§ 301-307 (2000 & Supp. 2004). For an analysis of this Act,
see, for example, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development:
Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REv.
1663 (1996).
13 Cf DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION:
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE
ACT 5-8 (2004) (asserting that even if the Bayh-Dole Act did not exist, technology
transfer between universities and industries would still grow).
14 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
15 Id. at 532-35 (emphasis added). For the traditional view, see Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F.
Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568); Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37
(C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217).
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Thirty years later in In re Brana,16 the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"), which was established in 1982 and
vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases, held that it
was unnecessary for pharmaceutical applicants to prove the ultimate utility
of the claimed invention in human bodies. Rather, an intermediate value
for further research and development was upheld as sufficiently useful.
17
In this specific case, an indirect allegation was made in the patent
specification that a chemical compound was effective against specified,
commonly used animal tumor models, and the court ruled that the patent
fulfilled the requirement of practical utility. That means pharmaceutical
inventors, when applying for patents, do not need to show the invention's
efficacy in human bodies. In other words, they can submit their
applications to the PTO as early in the invention process as completion of
the preclinical testing, either in vitro or on animals. Before this decision,
drug inventors had to wait until the therapeutic effectiveness of
pharmaceutical compounds was substantiated in clinical trials on actual
human bodies before they could patent their inventions. 18
This is not the first time that the Federal Circuit has retreated from
the Manson test. For example, the Federal Circuit took the same stance in
Cross v. Iizuka19 as it did in the later Brana case. In Cross, the court found
that in vitro testing of an alleged invention plus in vivo testing of
structurally similar compounds should be regarded as useful. The court
embraced Manson in that case, acknowledging that the "starting point for
a practical utility analysis is [Manson].",20 As a matter of fact, this line of
cases greatly undermined the position of the Manson decision that insists
currently available benefit to the public is a threshold for patentability.
Given the contribution of intermediate discoveries to the
biomedical sector, which involves layers of subsectors and long
development processes, 21 direct usage in human bodies may not be
necessary. But granting patents on inventions for which the asserted utility
is susceptible is quite another thing. When inventors generate new
compounds, they are usually unclear about the compounds' usage. Patents
on this kind of invention will authorize the inventor to reserve a class of
potential candidates for valuable products available only for his or her
own use.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit set up a utility presumption in the
Brana decision for patent applicants. 22 The utility assertion in the patent
16 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
17 Id. at 1566.
8 Id. at 1568.
19 753 F.2d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
20 Id. at 1046.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 31 & 79-87.
22 In re Brana, 51 F.3d at 1566.
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specification is deemed presumptively correct as long as the disclosed
enablement covers all terms used in the patent claims. The PTO bears the
initial burden of challenging that assertion. Only when the Patent Office
demonstrates reasonable doubt of the patent's utility, analyzed in light of
those having ordinary skill in the art, will the burden shift to the applicant
to proffer evidence showing the utility truly exists.
The PTO has also moved in the same direction. In 1995, the PTO
released new utility guidelines.23 The guidelines omitted the requirement
of a substantial utility showing as mandated by the Manson court, only
requiring that claimed inventions be "for any particular purpose" and that
their usage be "considered credible" to a person of ordinary skill in the
art. 24 Consequently, scores of patent applications claiming genes or gene
fragments were filed with the PTO, which led, in 1998, to the height of
patent issuance in this field.25
Biotechnology is a cash-starved industry. Even if a laboratory
successfully makes an upstream discovery, it still has a long way to go
before achieving true commercial success. One of the primary resulting
factors is a long course of research and commercialization following the
upstream discovery. As a result, the industry relies to a great extent on
financial support from the capital market, particularly venture capital. On
the one hand, upstream patenting visualizes the technological
achievements of biotech companies, providing critical assets for them to
solicit investment and other financial commitments. On the other hand,
upstream patenting casts obstacles in the way of independent research and
commercialization, posing possible threats to the open dissemination of
scientific information, and thus endangering the progress of biomedicine
and biomedical science.
26
B. THE DANGER POSED BY UPSTREAM PATENTS
The organization of scientific communities, in the words of
Michael Polanyi, fulfills the principle of "spontaneous coordination of
independent initiatives. "27 On one level, every scientist pursues his or her
own research initiatives by individually identifying his or her research
goals and agendas. But through the unbounded dissemination of scientific
ideas and breakthroughs, scientists keep abreast of the newest
23 In the Brana decision, the Federal Circuit took note of the proposed content of the
guidelines. See id. at 1564.
24 Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263, 36,264 (July 14, 1995).
25 See infra Section IV.A for details.
26 See generally MOWERY ET AL., supra note 13, at 185-92; Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. L.
REv. 77 (1999).
27 See Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1
MINERVA 54, 55 (1962), reprinted in 38 MINERVA 1, 2 (2000).
2007-2008
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developments in their areas of research, and they accordingly adjust their
agendas to concentrate on the most promising, yet unachieved part of the
subject. Scientists may modify their research approach to accommodate
new targets, as well. 28 In this way, scientists cooperate perfectly without
any centralized coordination.
29
The reason underlying this intangible cooperation is the
uncertainty and unpredictability of scientific research. Issues for academic
investigation often exceed the horizon of current science and knowledge.
Few persons, if any, can predict accurately where the real problem lies and
what approach will be the most promising and effective in its
exploration.30 As framed in models of innovation by economists like
Suzanne Scotchmer, the lack of stability results from the scarcity of
creative ideas and the features of investment in developing such ideas.
31
Investment in those ideas has three unique features. First, the investment is
often made before the pros and cons of the individual research route
become clear. Second, when expert opinions diverge because of the
technical complexity, there is no good standard for determining the
efficiency of research paths. Third, investments might lock in specific
routes for the research. After substantial investment and development, the
lesser performing research path that was chosen earlier might end up being
superior to excellent, later-developed alternatives. The possibility of new
research paths and their unpredictable timing thus add an unstable factor
to the investment decision. 32 Such factors are particularly manifest in the
biomedical sector. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA), a trade association of pharmaceutical research and
biotechnology companies in the United States, asserted vocally that in
every 10,000 potential medicines investigated by U.S. research-based
pharmaceutical firms, only one medicine is likely to succeed through the
research and development process and garner approval from the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA).' 3
Under the coordination of an "invisible hand" operating in the
scientific community, however, scientists' pursuit of personal achievement
weaves a closely knit web, as they tackle their common subject of research
from every potential angle. Dissemination of scientific findings carries the
28 Id. at 2-3.
29 Id. at 3.
30 Id. at 3; see also STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA
53 (1994).
31 Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Prfit in Sequential
Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20, 22 (1995); see also SUZANNE SCHOTCHMER,
INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 39-41 (2004); Ted O'Donoghue et al., Patent Breadth,
Patent Life and the Pace of Technological Progress, 7 J. ECON. MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 5
(1998).
32 See GREEN & SCHOTCHMER, supra note 31, at 55 58.
33 PhRMA: Innovation, http://www.phrma.org/innovation (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
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same function as the price mechanism does in the marketplace. 34 It works
as a guiding compass, leading scientists working on the same topic to
adjust their course of research to accommodate discoveries by their
colleagues around the globe. As a result, the dissemination of research
findings facilitates the division of scientific endeavors and better
allocation of research resources.
The first threat of biomedical upstream patenting is to open
discussion and the sharing of ideas in the scientific community. As
explained above, the self-guided coordination of individual research is
based on instant disclosure and the distribution of novel discoveries. By
virtue of upstream patenting, however, secrecy in the scientific universe is
on the rise and is posing a danger to the fundamental mechanisms relied
on by the scientific community. The origin of the secrecy is twofold. First,
because of the possibility of gaining a patent, scientists are less willing to
exchange their intuitions and thoughts with their colleagues than they were
in the past. By keeping creative ideas to themselves, scientists can prevent
their audience from conceiving patentable inventions based on the same
ideas in advance of them, thus securing priority of inventorship. They may
also delay publishing their research findings in order to first assess
whether to claim them in patents.
The second source of secrecy originates from patent licensing in
scientific research. Since patents are extending upstream, it is now a more
frequent occurrence for scientists to encounter patents and to garner patent
licenses in the course of their research. Driven by commercial instincts,
patent owners from the corporate world try to preserve every valuable
proceed derived from their technology. They usually require prior review
of publications generated in the research process as a condition of license
in order to appraise whether a patent application is adequate for the
research result. When patents are desired, corporate patentees will
withhold publication of the scientist's research for a longer time to ensure
that the necessary patent applications are filed.35 When patents are not a
feasible option, corporate patentees may still object to publication as an
attempt to preserve the discovery as a trade secret. They may also prohibit
sharing of their claimed technology and of any proceed derived therefrom
with anyone not covered in the license. The restrictions will be even
harsher if the patentee also provides financial sponsorship. As a result,
some university professors' laboratories are off-limits even for their
colleagues and students in the same department. 3 6 Imposing license
34 See Polanyi, supra note 27, at 4.
35 In the United States, there is a one-year grace period allowed between publishing the
inventive finding and filing for a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000 & Supp. 2004). But
in Europe and Japan, two major jurisdictions for patent application, there is no such
grace period. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
324 (2001).
36 DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HIGHER EDUCATION 64 (2003).
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conditions, however, is not just a privilege for corporate patentees;
academic patentees sometimes demand the same limitations.
37
C. THE THREAT FROM PATENTS FOR RESEARCH INPUTS
The second threat posed by upstream patenting is patent
proliferation in the research process, especially with regard to research
tools. Because of upstream patenting and the rise of the biotechnology
industry, nowadays a substantial number of biomedical patents are not for
end products or the processes leading to them, but rather for research
tools. These tools are inventions that cannot develop into an end product
in their own right, at least in certain respects, but that are capable of
assisting follow-on research and commercialization in developing valuable
products for the marketplace. A large portion of these tools are
intermediate products. They are useful in the biotechnology industry as
research inputs for mid- or downstream development of end products.
Though deployed in the research process, those tools do not appear in the
final output of the research.38 In the wake of the transformation of
biomedical patent composition, scientists have to deal with patents more
often than ever during their research course, which creates a series of
burdens in securing a patent license, including lingering negotiations and
an elevated level of royalty expenses.
For purely academic research, scientists could rely on the common
law experimental use defense (the so-called Bolar exemption) in the past.
Courts customarily used the "commercial purpose" test to determine
whether the experimental use defense could be raised in individual cases.
As Justice Story articulated in Sawin v. Guild,39 for alleged infringement
to qualify as experimental use, there must be no intention on the side of
the user to employ the patent for profit. The modem jurisprudence of the
Federal Circuit embraced this rule as well. For instance in Roche
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., the Federal Circuit explained
37 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH (NIH) WORKING GROUP ON
RESEARCH TOOLS (1998), available at
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm (referring to the discussion entitled
"Importing research tools from universities").
38 According to the broad definition adopted by the NIH working group, all research
inputs constitute research tools. See id. To the contrary, this Article divides them into
two categories: research targets and pure research tools. Research targets are not just
tools. They are the central objects that the whole research is working on. This category
contains therapeutic targets, including drug targets, which are research tools because
the embodiment of them may not reside in the final product, as well as drug
candidates, which are not research tools because the final product may be a species out
of a generic candidate. The research input for exploring alternatives to the patented
invention, namely for inventing or designing around, falls into this category as well.
For more explanations and examples of research targets and pure research tools, see
infra Subsections IV.C. 1 and IV.C.2.
3' 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12391) (citing Whittemore v. Cutter, 29
F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17600)).
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that courts should not "allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of
'scientific inquiry,' when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not
insubstantial commercial purposes." 40 Later, in Embrex, Inc. v. Service
Engineering Corp., the last case that the Federal Circuit heard on this issue
before Madey, the court still applied the commercial purpose rule,
affirming the district court's rejection of experimental use because the
defendant performed the tests at issue "expressly for commercial
purposes."
41
In Madey v. Duke University,42 however, the Federal Circuit
largely diminished the applicable realm of this exemption. Plaintiff John
Madey is a former professor in the Physics Department of Duke
University. After he took the position in 1988, he moved the free electron
laser (FEL) laboratory from Stanford University to Duke. Dr. Madey
obtained sole ownership of two patents covering certain equipment in the
laboratory. Owing to a dispute over the management of the FEL lab,
Madey was removed as its director and consequently resigned in 1998.
The university continued to use some of the equipment in the laboratory.
Dr. Madey subsequently filed a lawsuit against Duke for infringement of
his two patents.
43
Duke University asserted, inter alia, the experimental use defense.
The court not only rejected its assertion, but also narrowed the scope of
experimental use. The court stated that:
[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is
engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the
act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate
business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does
not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited
experimental use defense. Moreover, the profit or non-
profit status of the user is not determinative.
44
In this case, the court recognized that the defendant's use of the patented
devices had no commercial implications. The devices simply advanced
business goals of the university, including educating and enlightening
faculty and students, escalating its academic reputation, and attracting
research grants, outstanding students, and faculty members. Nevertheless,
under the rule as set forth above, the Federal Circuit held that this case still
fell outside the experimental use defense. The court essentially treated
40 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
41 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co.,
733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
42 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
43 Id. at 1352-53.
44 Id. at 1362.
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nonprofit institutions such as universities in the same way as it originally
treated commercial enterprises. One business objective of universities is
luring research grants, and the court noted that aggressive patent licensing
programs at major research universities generated financial revenue that
was not insubstantial.45 The court seemed to suggest that academic
institutions simply pursued a particular line of "business" that was not
fundamentally different from any line of normal commerce.
Under the new rule of "business furtherance" as formulated in the
Madey decision, scientists working in any institute that embraces a
purpose of advancing the progress of basic science will be expelled from
the realm of experimental use.46 As Duke University pointed out in its
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, the Madey decision virtually
"seal[ed] the coffin on the experimental use exception for private
universities. " 47 Against the backdrop of increased upstream patenting, the
Madey decision cuts off the legal resort that researchers may invoke and
will likely have profound repercussions on the progress of science. The
decision makes it possible for the initial discoverer of a certain line of
research to dominate all future development and innovation down the line
with his or her exclusive patent rights.
48
This Article focuses on the second threat that upstream patenting
brings about: the congestion of patent rights along the roads of research
45 Id. at 1363 n.7.
46 Tom Saunders, Comment, Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the
Future of the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261, 264 (2003).
47 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14, Duke Univ. v. Madey, 539 U.S. 958 (2003) (No.
02-1007) (cited in Jenniffer Miller, Case Brief, Sealing the Coffin on the Experimental
Use Exception, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12, 12). Public universities can still assert
sovereign immunity against patent infringement suits. See Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
In its amicus brief, the United States argued against this interpretation of the opinion in
Madey, stating that "if engaging in the 'legitimate business' of research itself were
enough to divest an institution of any experimental use defense, then there would have
been no reason for the court of appeals to have instructed the district court to undertake
the second half of the inquiry," namely "whether or not the use solely for amusement,
to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry." Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, at 10 11, Duke Univ. v. Madey, 539 U.S. 958 (2003) (No. 02-
1007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/2pet/6invit/2002-1007.pet.
ami.inv.pdf.
48 WILLIAM CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OMNIPRESENT, DISTRACTING,
IRRELEVANT? 30 (2004) [hereinafter CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]. There is
also a statutory research exemption in the patent code, but this exemption was provided
principally for the commercialization of drug candidates identified in early-on
upstream research, not for upstream research itself. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000 &
Supp. 2004). In Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005), the
Supreme Court extended the reach of this statutory research exemption upstream, yet
only to the stage of preclinical animal or in vitro testing whereby pharmaceutical
companies gather necessary data to file investigational new drug (IND) applications
with the FDA to start clinical trials. See id at 206-07.
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and commercialization. On a theoretical level, there are two principal
camps-the prospect theory and the anticommons theory-currently
debating the impact of upstream patents on biomedical research. The next
part of this Article will delve into the literature on both sides of the debate,
in search of insights for determining the true faces of the issues hidden
behind these convoluted phenomena.
III. THEORIES ON BIOMEDICAL UPSTREAM PATENTING: PROSPECT OR
ANTICOMMONS?
Having explained the development of upstream patenting in the
biomedical sector, a theoretical inquiry is now necessary. It is essential for
exploring the causes and consequences of this transformation and its
relationship with patent laws. Naturally, current theories on this issue are
built upon more general thoughts about the patent system as a whole.
Before getting to specific theories, a short review of the general thoughts
will provide a context and reference point for a better theoretical
understanding.
A. INCENTIVE To INVENT AND OTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PATENT
SYSTEM
Generating sufficient incentive to invent is the primary justification
for the patent system in the United States. The Constitution supports this
justification by granting to Congress the power "[lt]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, . . .securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and
Discoveries. " 49 In order to stimulate the emergence of inventions,
Congress established the patent system so that inventors could avoid the
disadvantage of public goods-a feature of innovations as an intangible
asset-and thus they could recoup the cost incurred in the inventing
process and reap the profits of resulting innovations. 50 Even though there
is evidence indicating that inventions would eventually be completed even
49 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. This is one of the few clauses on intellectual property that
has ever appeared in a national constitution. In countries without such a clause,
incentives to invent may still have primary status in justifying the patent system. In
Britain, for example, incentive to invent and incentive to disclose, see infra text
accompanying note 52, are as well primary justifications of patent laws. See LIONEL
BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 327 29 (2d ed. 2004);
CATHERINE COLSTON, PRINCIPLES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 21 27 (1999);
WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,
COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 133-42 (6th ed. 2007).
51 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13-14 (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science. Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017,
1024-28 (1989); Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-
Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 159, 175-77 (1942).
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without a patent regime, it is without doubt that the existence of patents
51accelerates their appearance.
In addition to providing incentive to invent, there are auxiliary
justifications that also vindicate the existence of the patent system. First
and foremost is the incentive to disclose the invention. The patent system
requires inventors to describe explicitly in the patent specification the
claimed invention, as well as how to make and use it. The disclosure
requirement is considered a quid pro quo for the exclusive rights that
patentees are entitled to, with an aim of letting the public benefit from
52learning the technological progress made by the invention. The patent
system also provides an incentive to commercialize patented inventions53
and incentive to invent or to design around earlier inventions.54 Though
patents provide substantial incentives to invent and to disclose the
innovation, a question remains in the biomedical sector, where upstream
patents have increased dramatically, as to whether too many patents
actually deter innovation and delay disclosure.
B. PROSPECT THEORY
The prospect theory supports the upstream proliferation of patents.
It contends that the patent system should award inventions a broad scope
of claims early on in the innovation pipeline. Upstream patents themselves
tend to be broad in their scope of rights since prior art is much sparser in
nascent fields of technology. The upstream invention sometimes even
initiates a whole new line of research inquiries. Added to this natural
tendency, however, the prospect theory argues for a greater breadth in the
scope of claims.
Scholars in the prospect theory camp compare the patent system to
a system of prospects which assigns the right to explore minerals or other
natural resources within a specified area to the one who discovers the
resource at that location first.55 These scholars allege that patent rights
5 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 91 (1974) (citing JONATHON R.
COLE & STEPHEN COLE, SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN SCIENCE 12-13, 229-30 (1973);
JAMES D. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX (1968); Robert K. Merton, Singleton and
Multiples in Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 343 (1973); Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 284-85 (1977);
William E Ogburn & Dorothy Thomas, Are Inventions Inevitable? A Note on Social
Evolution, 37 POL. SCI. Q. 83 (1922)).
52 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 50, at 294-95; Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1028-30;
Rich, supra note 50, at 177.
53 F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85
MINN. L. REv. 697, 736-46 (2001); Robert P Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of
Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 10-12 (1992); Rich, supra note 50, at 177-80.
54 See generally DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 67-71 (3d ed.
2004).
55 Kitch, supra note 51, at 267-75.
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could and should operate like mineral claims by enclosing the neighboring
area for the initial inventor to explore. Broad upstream patents assign
inventors property rights at the outset of technological development and
keep these enclosed areas at the patentees' disposal; thus, they are ideal
patents in the view of prospect theorists. In their opinion, broad upstream
patents assure the initial inventor of any proceeds derived from the area
marked by vast patent claims, and therefore could encourage incentive to
an invention race, similar to the gold rush that occurred at the turn of the
twentieth century in the American West. Such patents could also mobilize
patentees to invest significantly in commercializing the claimed
inventions, so as to bring the benefit and convenience created by the
invention to the marketplace for the public to enjoy and utilize.56
1. The Argument for Broad Upstream Patents
The reasons for the prospect theorists' position can be summarized
as follows. As stated in Section III.B, the significant incentives provided
by broad upstream patents could attract substantial investment in initial
inventive endeavors.57 Moreover, they could protect investments in
proceeds generated by follow-on research and commercialization of the
invention. Follow-on research is a category of basic research that looks
further into the properties or potentials of the invention; it also refers to
applied research for the purpose of investigating possible ways to
commercialize the invention. An example of the latter is the struggle to
locate a drug candidate acting on a patented drug target, such as cell
receptors or disease pathways in the human body.
Commercialization then develops the results of the follow-on
research into a commercial product. Manufacturing or other kinds of
know-how would be generated at this stage. The establishment of
manufacturing facilities, distribution channels, and promotional campaigns
are also part of the commercialization process. 58 In addition to these initial
costs, the first mover to the market bears another layer of costs, including
expenditure to introduce new types of products to the market, to set up a
viable business model, and to educate consumers about the new
merchandise, to name a few. The investment and its proceeds are
vulnerable to appropriation by latecomers prepared to cut into the same
line of products; however, an upstream patent with breadth would prevent
this free riding. 59 In the biomedical sector, where follow-on research and
commercialization together could take more than ten years and consume
56 See Kieff, supra note 53, at 707-12.
57 Kitch, supra note 51, at 275.
58 Id. at 276-77.
59 Kieff, supra note 53, at 707-09.
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several hundred million dollars, the need for greater incentives for the
development of patented inventions is even more intense.
60
Another ground for supporting broad upstream patents comes from
the capacity of enabling patentees to coordinate follow-on development or
inventing-around endeavors. The more expansive the patent scope is, the
more downstream developments and potential substitutes the patent could
cover and dominate. 61 In the view of prospect theorists, this coordination
could create benefits such as superior development of the patented
invention, avoidance of duplicative investments from competing
researchers, the arrangement of productive license transactions, and the
facilitation of information sharing among researchers. 62 In the biomedical
sector, because of the uncertainty and heightened risk of follow-on
research and commercialization, patentees may have more incentives to
coordinate license and follow-on development efficiently so as to control
and manage this risk.63
2. The Extra Incentive is Unnecessary
The aforementioned rationales cannot soundly support the
proposition of the prospect theorists. There is no need to expand the scope
of patents to provide extra incentives for innovation. Similar to other lines
of business, if patentees have the chance to recoup the sunk costs
expended during the innovation process (including reasonable returns for
entrepreneurship or inventorship), this should be enough to sustain
sufficient innovation in society. No extra incentive beyond the recoupment
of sunk costs is required for the patent system to inspire innovation.
64
Conversely, expanding the scope of patents would reward patentees
excessively and would fail to keep their property rights commensurate
with their real contribution to the society. Given that each patent
represents a piece of the public's sacrifice of its freedom to imitate to the
dominion of the patentee-that is, each patent represent a subordination of
the public to the inventor's exclusive rights to make, use, or sell the
patented product-broad patent scope could hardly be justifiable if the
patentee did not make commensurate contributions in return for the
public's sacrifice.
65
60 Id. at 724-26.
61 For a patent to coordinate its substitutions, it essentially has to incorporate the latter
into its scope of claims. This condition is not true in follow-on development, since the
claimed invention may be required as research tools in the development process.
62 Kitch, supra note 51, at 276, 278-79.
63 Kieff, supra note 53, at 726.
64 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv.
1031, 1050 (2005); Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 635, 638 (1996).
65 See Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 609, 623-26 (1993).
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Prospect theorists allege that most patents do not generate
significant market power. As long as the market remains competitive,
inventors do not garner excessive profits from patent rights. The patent
system also enables price discrimination, which decreases the deadweight
loss of social welfare that patent rights bring about. 66 Even though each of
these is admittedly true, upstream patents would still fortify the market
status of patentees. No matter what extra market power patentees gain
through upstream patents, the patents will nevertheless drive the market
further away from a competitive one. Output restraint and deadweight loss
are more likely in the less competitive market.
67
Furthermore, price discrimination is not an easy task. First, it
entails substantial amounts of data on customer preferences. But the more
difficult problem is how to segregate consumers with a high willingness to
pay from those with a low willingness and how to avoid arbitrage between
them. 68 The patent system only makes innovation excludable, eliminating
its feature of public goods and turning it into a status vaguely similar to
normal commodities. No extra assistance in price discrimination is
provided from the patent side. Moreover, even if price discrimination is
implemented, it enriches patentees at the expense of consumer surplus,
which enlarges the sacrifice of the public and thus is not necessarily
desirable.
3. Follow-On Research and Commercialization Are Already Protected by
Various Mechanisms
The current patent system is equally available for protecting the
proceeds of follow-on research and commercialization. Prospect theorist
Edmund Kitch praised the patent system for its uniform incentive structure
across various subject matters.69 If patentees make any progress against
the state of the art during the follow-on research or commercialization
stages, they can always count on the patent system to provide legal
protection. Trade secrets are another feasible way of protecting know-how
arising during commercialization, especially with regard to manufacturing
processes and business strategies.
As groundbreakers in the marketplace, first movers enjoy
particular benefits as well as heavier burdens. They may grasp a period of
lead time over competitors, which is still one of the primary ways to
appropriate the value of corporate innovations. 70 They usually secure other
66 See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 53, at 735-36.
67 See, e.g., MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 40-44
(2004); SCOTCHMER, supra note 31, at 36-37; Lemley, supra note 64, at 1059-60.
68 SCOTCHMER, supra note 31, at 37-3 8.
69 Professor Kitch believes patents are preferable to trade secrets in this regard, as trade
secrets are much more effective in process rather than product protection. Kitch, supra
note 51, at 279.
70 According to a survey conducted in the 1980s by Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter,
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competitive edges that are excellent for capitalizing on the innovations.
First movers confront the learning curve sooner, thus improving product
quality and decreasing costs more effectively through learning by doing.
They also have the opportunity to get a head start on promotion and
marketing. Valuable brand images and goodwill can be established during
the lead time carved out by innovation. Furthermore, trademark law
effectively protects these values. 71 These benefits, which owe their origins
to innovation, combine to create a useful arsenal for marketplace battles.
Certain investments made at the commercialization stage, such as
those in constructing distribution channels, are common expenditures for
all related lines of products. They have tremendous value beyond the
roaring sales of an individual item. These commercial assets can also serve
as a foundation for companies to extend their lines of business. And, if
well utilized, these assets may generate a fortune. Protecting such assets
with the patent system, where the primary purpose is to prevent
misappropriation of useful inventions, is neither necessary nor appropriate.
Moreover, when the scale of the market for relevant products is limited,
there is no space left for competitors to copy the products or business
strategies of the first mover. In this situation, latecomers have to invent
new products or identify market strategies of their own.
It is true that in the biomedical sector the process of follow-on
research and commercialization is protracted, intricate, and costly. On the
other hand, among all major industries, the patent system's protection
against misappropriation has the greatest effect in the pharmaceutical
72industry. Considering simultaneously the fact that any invention
conceived during the development process still qualifies for patenting, a
particular emphasis on the length of the process does not make the
argument for broad upstream patents more plausible or persuasive.
4. Coordination Goes Against the Very Nature of Scientific Research and
the Patent System: Searle, Integra, and CCR5
Turning to the argument based on coordination of follow-on
development and inventing-around, there is no indication that centralized
coordination by a single entity would be truly operational in the scientific
field. On the contrary, scientific research is one of the areas that are in dire
need of freelancers and mavericks. 73 As a matter of fact, the follow-on
lead time is generally more effective in protecting the competitive advantages of new
processes and products than the patent system. See Richard C. Levin et al.,
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 1987
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 793-96.
71 See id According to the survey, "moving quickly down the learning curve" and "sales
or service efforts" have approximately the same effectiveness in appropriating
innovation value as does lead time. Id. at 793-96.
72 Id. at 796-98.
73 Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1059-65; Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public
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development of an upstream patent may still fall within the realm of
scientific research, which needs unbounded investigation of all avenues of
inquiry. More often than not, a researcher will not know in advance what
the best way to approach a problem is. 74 Most of the time, the approach
comes to light only after trial and error. Coordination on ways and means
of performing follow-on research and inventing-around may collide with
this aspect of scientific research. Coordination obstructs the implicit
cooperation embedded in the scientific community, which allows
independent scientists working on the same topic to explore it
collaboratively using their respective viewpoints, methodologies and
special talents.75
There are actual cases demonstrating that coordination may not be
necessary in follow-on development. The lawsuit between the University
76of Rochester and G.D. Searle is a telling example. Scientists at the
University invented an assay to screen compounds that inhibit only
enzyme COX-2 and not enzyme COX-1. These enzymes are distinct types
of cyclooxygenases that traditional non-steroidal medicine blocks
simultaneously to heal inflammation. In the early 1990s, however,
scientists found that inhibiting COX- 1 did not contribute to anti-
inflammatory treatment and that it instead caused undesirable side effects
such as upset stomachs, irritation, ulcers, and bleeding.77
The University received a patent for the screening method in 1998
and obtained another patent for the method to treat inflammation in 2000.
The claimed treatment method involved compounds selectively inhibiting
COX-2 rather than COX-1. Nonetheless, the patent specification did not
indicate any compound with such a characteristic. On the day the
treatment patent was issued, the University sued G.D. Searle and three
other companies for the sale of Celebrex and Bextra, two COX-2
inhibiting medicines allegedly infringing the patent. Without any
coordination from the patentee, G.D. Searle successfully invented and
commercialized these drugs, passed all necessary clinical testing, and
secured marketing approval from the FDA.78
In a number of cases, independent researchers proceed even better
than patentees or licensees that are coordinated in follow-on research and
commercialization. The litigation between Merck KGaA and Integra
Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 81, 130.
74 Rai, supra note 26, at 124. For a discussion of the general features of scientific
research, see GOLDBERG, supra note 30, at 6-13.
75 This is the notion of "spontaneous coordination of independent initiatives" proffered by
Michael Polanyi; see supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
76 Univ. of Rochester v. GD. Searle Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
77 Id. at 917-18.
71 See id. at 918-19. After a series of mergers and acquisitions which began in 1985, G.D.
Searle became a part of Pfizer in 2003. See id at 919 n.2.
2007-2008
20
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 10 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol10/iss1/7
BIOMEDICAL UPSTREAM PATENTING AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Lifesciences illustrates precisely this possibility. 79 Integra Lifesciences
discovered the short tripeptide sequence Arg-Gly-Asp-also referred to as
the "RGD peptide"-and acquired five patents for it. The RGD peptide
induced cell adhesion and growth in human bodies and was anticipated to
perform medical functions such as promoting the healing of wounds,
prosthesis adhesion, and the growth of new blood vessel branches. 80 But
for years, the inventors could not effectively develop commercial
applications of the invention, and they eventually sold the patents to
Integra Lifesciences. 81 Again without the patentee's coordination, Dr.
David Cheresh of the Scripps Research Institute discovered that cyclic
RGD peptides could resolve certain problems occurring with the linear
RGD peptides found by the inventors. Dr. Cheresh also discovered that the
new peptides possessed the potential to suppress tumor growth by starving
cancerous tumor cells.
82
With the funding of Merck KGaA, Dr. Cheresh directed in vitro
and in vivo experiments on three types of cyclic RGD peptides, checking
their efficacy, specificity, and toxicity. In 1997, the Scripps research team
chose EMD 121874 as the best candidate for clinical testing. In 1998, the
National Cancer Institute agreed to sponsor the clinical trials and filed an
Investigational New Drug (IND) application with the FDA to start the
regulatory approval process. 83 When learning of the collaboration between
Merck KGaA and the Scripps Institute, Integra Lifesciences offered Merck
KGaA a license agreement. Merck KGaA declined the offer after lengthy
negotiations and Integra Lifesciences brought an infringement lawsuit
against them, alleging that the cyclic RGD peptides fell within the scope
of the patent claims. 84
Sometimes upstream patents are so expansive that their scope
extends to cover follow-on or parallel inventions that are within an arm's
length of the patentees' findings. In those cases, the patented technology
make only limited contribution to the ensuing discovery. The most notable
example is reach-through claims. In this type of claim, inventors extend
their upstream patents to contain potential downstream inventions that are
facilitated by, but independent of the original inventions. In Searle, the
University of Rochester was granted reach-through claims and asserted
them against G.D. Searle. What the University found was a method to
79 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rev'd, 545
U.S. 193 (2005).
80 Integra, 331 F.3d at 863; id. at 873 (Newman, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 873 (Newman, J., dissenting); Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental
Use Exemption from United States Patent lnfringement Liability: Implications for
University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REv. 917, 948
(2004).
12 Integra, 331 F.3d at 873-74 (Newman, J., dissenting); 545 U.S. at 197-98.
13 Integra, 545 U.S. at 198-99; Integra, 331 E3d at 874 (Newman, J., dissenting).
14 Integra, 331 F.3d at 863.
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screen possible medicinal compounds that selectively inhibit the COX-2
enzyme, a drug target. But in addition to that, the University got another
patent on the method for blocking the function of COX-2 by the inhibiting
compound, a drug candidate that was unknown to the University and the
very object that the invention was meant to find out.85 The gap between
screening drug candidates through intended targets and actually
identifying qualified candidates was not so easy to overcome. New
technologies such as combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput
screening (HTS) had already been adopted in pharmaceutical
investigations by the late 1990s. These fancy tools generated a substantial
number of "hits," i.e., signals of possible drug candidates. However,
hardly any "leads," i.e., qualified candidates for clinical trials, were found
and optimized through following these hits. 86 The facts illuminate why
reach-through claims for separate downstream inventions are baseless and
off-limits. It thus was no surprise that the Federal Circuit held in Searle
that this type of claim was invalid for failing the written description
requirement as stipulated in 35 U.S.C. § 112.87
Besides reach-through claims, there are still other types of
upstream patents possessing considerable breadth. Upstream inventions
are likely to be pioneers in their technological field because of their
position in the course of scientific progress.88 But still, an upstream patent
that claims exclusive rights in excess of technological findings that the
inventor actually discover may over-compensate the patentee while at the
same time suppressing the incentives and rewards for other inventors to
explore neighboring technologies. Even assuming, arguendo, that
coordination is beneficial for follow-on innovation, the patentee may not
be acquainted with methods for developing the invention. The problem
85 Claim One of the patent is representative: "A method for selectively inhibiting PGHS-2
[i.e., COX-2,] activity in a human host, comprising administering a non-steroidal
compound that selectively inhibits activity of the PGHS-2 gene product to a human
host in need of such treatment." U.S. Patent No. 6,048,850 col.71 1.36 39 (filed June 7,
1995).
86 Roger Lahana, How Many Leads from HTS?, 4 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 447, 447
(1999). The situation was better around 2003 when scientists started paying more
attention to absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excretion (ADVE) parameters of
potential drug candidates. Even so, there may still be challenges ahead, such as how to
improve virtual screening techniques and how to synthesize desirable molecules in a
dose-dependent and specific way. See Hugo Kubinyi, Drug Research. Myths, Hype and
Reality, 2 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 665, 666 67 (2003); Jorgen Drews,
Strategic Trends in the Drug Industry, 8 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 411, 414, 416
(2003).
87 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
As the Federal Circuit once explained, without extensive prior art to confine their
claims, pioneering inventors usually obtain patents of a broader scope than
nonpioneers who have to adopt narrow claims to make their way through congested




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 10 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol10/iss1/7
BIOMEDICAL UPSTREAM PATENTING AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
becomes acute when it comes to research tools, where the patented
invention and its applications may well belong to different research
circles.
89
This situation arose when Human Genome Science (HGS)
acquired a patent on the gene sequence encoding the CCR5 receptor.
When the sequence was first found, the company gauged it as a gene
coding for a cell receptor by comparing it with known homologues in its
database. 90 HGS filed for a patent in June 1995, expecting the gene to be a
research tool of use chiefly in the development of anti-inflammatory
therapies, a utility that had not been fully established as of the filing. 91 Six
months later, however, French scientist Dr. Parmentier and researchers
from other institutes, including the Aaron Diamond AIDS Research Center
and the NIH, confirmed that the CCR5 receptor was the route that the HIV
virus used to break into an immune cell, a function that was never known
to HGS. 92
This instance corroborates the Integra case, illustrating that
independent researchers can do a much better job than those who are
coordinated by patentees. It also indicates how the follow-on innovation
may shift to areas that are unfamiliar to the upstream inventor. Given the
uncertainty and unpredictability of scientific research,93 even experts may
not be able to adequately coordinate the follow-on development in their
own fields-not to mention the difficulties that a newcomer to a research
field would have with such development. Sadly, the patent was granted to
HGS in February 2000, covering all potential medical applications of the
gene sequence. 94 Such a broad upstream patent subordinates true experts
in fields of development, such as HIV research, to the coordination of the
patentees, who are not specialized in the new fields of application.
Fortunately, HGS appears thus far uninterested in coordinating the follow-
on research for CCR5, as it is tolerating unlicensed academic research and
has already committed to several license agreements.
95
In addition to going against the nature of scientific research,
coordination also goes against fundamental features of the patent system,96
one of which is a system of decentralization. Inventors do not need
permission from a central research authority before going on to create
89 Strandburg, supra note 73, at 127.
90 COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (CIPR), INTEGRATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 128 (2002).
91 CORNISH, supra note 48, at 16-17; NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF
PATENTING DNA: ADSCUSSION PAPER 41 (2002).
92 CIPR, supra note 90, at 128; NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 91, at 41.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
94 CIPR, supra note 90, at 128.
95 NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 91, at 41.
96 SCOTCHMER, supra note 31, at 38.
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something. The technological prospects, potential value of the project, and
its probable cost will determine which inventions are pursued and what
resources are dispensed. If these estimates are wrong, inventors will bear
the risks and costs. A decentralized system like this could prevent
creativity from strangulation by anyone other than the inventors
themselves. Patentees' coordination of follow-on development, however,
functions just like a central research authority for individual lines of
innovation, which defeats the virtues of decentralization in the patent
system.
5. Coordination is Anticompetitive
Conferring a broad patent on the inventor for the purposes of
coordinating follow-on development and inventing-around activities is
equivalent to providing leverage to him or her for extending the patent
rights in a way that restrains competition in downstream markets that are
beyond the reach of the original invention. On the other hand, leveraging
patent rights to affect competition beyond the scope of the patent may
constitute patent misuse or an antitrust violation. 97 As a result, an
excessive patent claim that includes downstream terrains may provide a
safe means for the inventor to circumvent these checks on illegal patent
right extensions. The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 198898 explicitly
recognized that an inventor conditioning a patent license on another
product or license solely from him- or herself could constitute patent
misuse, so far as the inventor possesses market power over the
embodiments of the patent on which the conditioning is based.99 The same
situation could also be considered an illegal tying arrangement under
antitrust law. 100 A broad patent claim, however, may totally release the
inventor from the extensive legal scrutiny of downstream coordination. In
addition, courts consider other types of patent leveraging in violation of
antitrust law. For example, collecting royalties beyond the patent scope,
such as on unpatented products or after the patent's expiration date, has
97 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 54, at 1103-04, 1130-31; LANDES & POSNER, supra note
50, at 372-73 (opposing the existing laws).
9' Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5)
(2000)).
99 Section 271 (d) of the Patent Act now provides:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement . . . of a patent shall be
denied relief for deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by
reason of his having done one or more of the following: ... (5) conditioned the license
of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a
license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of
the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the
patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000) (emphasis added).
100 See, e.g., Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 331 U.S. 392 (1947).
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repeatedly been held illegal. 101 In light of these inconsistencies, it appears
that the very idea of downstream coordination runs afoul of the legal
principle against anticompetitive leveraging of market power to adjacent
markets.
There is no basis to believe that a research field dominated by a
single entity will operate more efficiently than a domain of competition,
which we normally trust with respect to economic affairs. 10 2 If no
convincing evidence is presented, it would be paradoxical to indulge
expansive upstream patents in restraining competition at the upstream
level or in the follow-on development. In a study conducted in Italy,
69.2% of the surveyed patentees would have made their invention whether
or not the patent system existed. 10 3 This propensity was stronger for
inventors working in an enterprise-ranging from 68.0% to 80.4%-and
was positively correlated to the size of the company. 104 For individual
inventors, the percentage who would have invented despite the
nonexistence of the patent system was only 65. 1%.105 A logical inference
is that something must be much more attractive to inventors in their
innovative activities than simply the possibility of attaining a patent. As
demonstrated above, "lead time," "moving quickly down the learning
curve," and "sales and service efforts" are all effective means of
preserving and deploying the value of innovations. 10 6 They are great
incentives for corporate inventions. The driving force behind the pursuit of
these marketplace advantages is competition. Taking this evidence into
account, it would be fair to say that competition is still essential in the
patent world and that deviation from this concept is still absurd.
Patent protection is more effective and thus more important in the
biomedical sector than in ordinary industries. Surveys show that 60% to
65% of pharmaceutical inventions would not have been developed without
a patent system.l17 Nevertheless, once patent scopes become so expansive
as to allow coordination to displace competition in follow-on development
and inventing-around, inventors might just sit on their patents in order to
reap profits, while blocking new innovations that might substitute their
101 E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Brulotte v.
Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., 293 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2002).
102 Robert P Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 877 (1990).
103 Giorgio Sirilli, Patents and Inventors: An Empirical Study, 16 RES. POL'Y 157, 164-66
(1987).
114 Id. at 164 tbl.10.
105 Id.
106 See supra text accompanying notes 70-7 1.
107 C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 199
tbl.9.2 (1973); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32
MGMT. SCI. 173, 174-75 (1986).
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own. Competition keeps inventors on their toes, but excessive protection
allows them to relax and therefore could slow down the progress of
technology. This is not to say that increased competition will necessarily
lead to an increase in innovation. All things being equal, monopolies
generate fewer incentives to invent than does perfect competition.
108
Consequently, while the prospect theory provides patentees with
dominance in their respective technological fields, it also creates
inefficiencies to the promotion of invention-the primary rationale for the
patent system.
Throughout history, numerous examples have illustrated how
excessive protection may foster stagnation in innovation, but that
competition can transform the dire situation. Of ten technologies recently
adopted in the telecommunications sector, the average time between
inception and initial commercial use was shorter when the market was
more competitive. 10 9 Moreover, for individual technology, commercial use
often took place when contention was introduced in the relevant market.
For instance, DSL was not offered for retail high-speed internet access
even after the internet first became popular. It was not until the 1996
Telecommunications Act brought competition for data customers into
regional markets that DSL services were provided commercially. 110 In
another example, fiber optic technology was both available and ready for
the market in 1977. But commercial use of this technology did not begin
to accelerate until the mid-1980s, subsequent to emerging competition in
the long-distance telephone service market and Sprint's advertisement for
installation of a fiber optic system. 
111
In the realm of patents, Thomas Edison's famous patent for the
filament of incandescent lamps demonstrated exactly the tendencies of
idle innovation. 112 Edison received a patent for the carbon filament
invention on January 27, 1880.11' After introducing the new incandescent
lamp and its first modifications to the market, however, Edison's attention
was redirected to other fields of experimentation. His company, Edison
General Electric, did not make many substantial improvements to its
products until after merging with Thomson-Houston in 1896.114 At first,
108 MOTTA, supra note 67, at 56-57.
109 The ten technologies are touch-tone dialing, digital switching, ISDN transmission,
electronic stored-program-control, SS-7 signaling, fiber-optic transport, automatic
switching, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) service, cable modem service, and digital
wireless transmission. See Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and Deployment qf New
Technology in U.S. Telecommunications, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 115.
110 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996); see also Shelanski, supra note 109, at 116.
111 Shelanski, supra note 109, at 116-17.
112 See generally Merges & Nelson, supra note 102, at 885-87.
113 U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Nov. 4, 1879).
114 ARTHUR A. BRIGHT, JR., THE ELECTRIC-LAMP INDUSTRY: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FROM 1800 TO 1947, at 122 (1949).
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several lamp-producing corporations competed effectively with Edison's
company by providing timely improvement and better electrical
efficiency. 115 However, between 1885 and 1894, progress in lamp design
was seriously hampered by protracted and expensive patent struggles
between Edison's company and its competitors. 116 The filament patent was
finally validated in court in 1891.117 After the ruling, Edison's company
swiftly acquired injunctions that closed down a number of competitors.
The company had no intention of accepting licensees; rather, it prepared to
regain a monopoly for the remainder of the patent life that ended in
1894.118 Relying on the basic filament patent, Edison's company
suppressed follow-on innovations for incandescent lamps, yet generated
no important improvements of its own.119
One of the alleged reasons for artificial coordination is to avoid
duplicate innovation efforts. As a matter of fact, duplication is essential
for competition in the marketplace. Assuming no competitors exist,
competition will not take place. Even if competitors do exist, if no surplus
capacity is available, why will they dash for potential customers?
Inventors might just sit back and wait for business to come to them.
Customers not accommodated by competitors will sooner or later turn to
suppliers who still have ample capacities. In addition, duplication is not
equal to pure waste. Conversely, duplicative endeavors might make
possible certain benign results, such as the rapid unveiling of new
inventions, early validation by the scientific community, and the
appearance of more alternative technologies. 
120
6. Coordination in Self-Interest
Patentees may coordinate follow-on development of the patented
invention, but only for their own interest. 121 For the sake of fully grasping
115 Id. at 122-23.
116 Id. at 138-39.
117 Edison Elec. Light Co. v. U.S. Elec. Lighting Co., 47 F. 454 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891),
aff'd, 52 F. 300 (2d Cir. 1892).
118 BRIGHT, supra note 114. For an explanation why the duration of the filament patent
was cut short from the normal seventeen-year span, see id at 91 n.28.
119 Rochelle Dreyfuss once suggested that the same idleness might have arisen in Rite-
Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). In this case, the
infringing product was in direct competition with the plaintiff's product, which was not
covered by the patent at suit. The plaintiff only deployed the patent at suit in a
noncompeting product. By doing so, the plaintiff failed to provide customers with the
option of choosing between a fully or a partially automated machine. See Rochelle
Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental
Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARiz. L. REv. 457, 467 n.43 (2004).
120 CHISUM El AL., supra note 54, at 66 67; Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 64, at 1062-
63; Rai, Scientific Research, supra note 26, at 124 n.247.
121 See generally Strandburg, supra note 73, at 127-29.
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profits flowing from the exclusive coverage of the patent claims, patentees
will act rationally to keep opportunities to themselves if there is any
chance for them to conceive the follow-on innovations. If the chance of
doing so is too slim, they will then consider licensing the invention. For
the sake of avoiding competition between licensees that may decrease the
prospect profits of the patentees, nonexclusive license is not so frequent
here. Given the uncertainty and unpredictability of follow-on research,
122
patentees incline to license their invention to whoever is willing to pay the
highest amount in royalties, rather than to the group or individual who has
the greatest capacity for exploring its full potential. In other words, the
amount of royalties may not be a proper measure of the talents and
abilities of follow-on developers. Developers with inferior technological
competence depend more on patent rights to protect latent profits flowing
from the downstream innovation, while developers with superior capacity
may attribute these profits, to a larger extent, to their own talents and
endeavors. Due to this disparity in attribution, the former may accept an
amount well beyond the limit that the latter is willing to pay for a license,
an inclination that could drive the claimed invention away from capable
hands that can fully optimize its technical prospects.
In the biomedical sector, patent protection is more effective than in
other industries,123 and the premiums flowing from patent exclusivity is
thus even higher. As a result, companies in this industry have a history of
pursuing "blockbuster" products that generate at least $1 billion in annual
revenue, in order to support their high percentage of growth. 124 This
feature makes patentees increasingly concerned with the profits or
royalties they may receive from their inventions, lest a "blockbuster"
among them might slip away unnoticed. Consequently, coordination in
self-interest may be even more drastic in the biomedical sector than it is
for ordinary patents.
7. Incompatibility with Developments in the Judiciary
Jurisprudential developments run counter to the basic propositions
of prospect theory. In Searle, the Federal Circuit invalidated reach-through
claims, which were purported for upstream patentees to seize lucrative
downstream inventions by expanding patent scopes. 125 In In re Fisher, theFederal Circuit made another important decision, holding that patents for
122 See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
123 See supra text accompanying note 72.
124 See CLARK GILBERT & RATNA G. SARKAR, MERCK: CONFLICT AND CHANGE 1-8
(2005); JEFFREY ROBINSON, PRESCRIPTION GAMES: MONEY, EGO AND POWER INSIDE
THE GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 25-27 (2001); Robert F. Service, Surviving
the Blockbuster Syndrome, 303 SCIENCE 1796, 1796-97 (2004).
125 See supra text accompanying notes 87-89. For a discussion of ESTs and EST patents,
see infra Subsection III.C. 1 and Section IV.A.
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expressed sequence tags (ESTs) are invalid. 126 This was a bio-agriculture
case. The plaintiff discovered five ESTs in the maize genome and applied
for a patent, which was later rejected by the patent examiner and by the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the PTO. The Federal Circuit
affirmed the decision below, holding that the patent statute's requirements
of utility and enablement were not fulfilled. While the plaintiff disclosed
in the application seven ways to use the ESTs, the court rejected all of
them for not being specific and substantial. 127
For utility to be substantial, the court reasoned, it needed to have
real-world benefits for the public in a currently available form. Added to
that, the required utility had to be specific as well-that is, not vague or
generic. 128 In this case, each of the claimed ESTs distinctively
corresponded to a single gene, yet the functions of those genes were still
unknown. The court found the use to be insubstantial, indicating that the
Fisher scenario was similar to what the Supreme Court encountered in
Brenner, where the Court held that a process to prepare chemicals of
unknown functions was void of substantial use.129 The Federal Circuit in
turn rejected the utility as non-specific and general, noting that: "[n]othing
about [the patentee's] seven alleged uses set the five claimed ESTs apart
from the more than 32,000 ESTs disclosed in the ... application or indeed
from any EST derived from any organism." 130 The EST with no learned
functions is the most upstream outcome of a whole series of research and
development in the biomedical sector. By denying its patentability, the
Federal Circuit once again departed from the proposition of the prospect
theory.
Taking Searle and Fisher together, the Federal Circuit really
demonstrates its intention to control the scope of upstream patents within a
reasonable limit. Whether the court is just cutting off some type of
overbroad upstream claims, or it will proceed to tighten up the standards
of patentability and to reduce the coverage of upstream patents still
remains to be seen.
126 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
127 Id. at 1365-68. The seven proffered uses were: "(1) serving as a molecular marker for
mapping the entire maize genome . . .(2) measuring the level of mRNA in a tissue
sample via microarray ... (3) providing a source for primers for use in the polymerase
chain reaction (PCR)... (4) identifying... polymorphism; (5) isolating promoters...
(6) controlling protein expression; and (7) locating genetic molecules of other plants
and organisms." Id. at 1368.
12 Id. at 1370-72.
129 Id. at 1372-74.
130 Id. at 1374. Because the enablement requirement commands disclosure of the way to
use the invention, it incorporates the utility requirement implicitly. When the Federal
Circuit concluded that the required utility was missing in this case, it correspondingly
found the application failing to satisfy the enablement requirement. Id. at 1378-79.
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C. ANTICOMMONS THEORY
In contrast, the anticommons theory contends that, at present, the
field of biomedical research is congested with too many patents. Patents
are now everywhere, covering everything from DNA, proteins, cell
receptors, cell lines, animal models, and other biological materials, to
reagents, testing kits and procedures, and more. In every line of research
and commercialization, a host of patentees is given the right to exclude
others, without providing anyone a privilege to skip those barriers and
conduct experiments along the line of research. 131
1. The Anticommons Phenomena
Patents are an abstraction, meaning that one can claim the same
object in a number of different ways. As a result, patents may overlap with
one another. When there is no overlapping, multiple patents may be
granted on the same basic unit of practical use, such as a gene. The most
salient example is expressed sequence tags (ESTs). ESTs are cDNA
fragments that represent expressed portions of genes. 132 In 1991, the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) led the way to seeking patents on ESTs
while the specific function of the fragment or the gene is still unknown.
133
Though the NIH later became antagonistic to EST patents, private genome
companies had already garnered a substantial number of EST patents in
advance of cautions from the PTO and the Federal Circuit about such
applications. 134
There is another group of patents that are issued not on the same
object, but which spread along the lines of biomedical research and
commercialization. Patents on receptors illustrate this situation. When
131 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 698. "Patent thickets" are a similar but somewhat
distinctive concept. This concept focuses on patent proliferation in end products and
manufacturing processes. By contrast, the anticommons theory stresses the mass of
patents in the research and development process. For a discussion of patent thickets,
see Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et
al. eds., 2001).
132See, e.g., Wikipedia, Expressed Sequence Tag,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expressed Sequence Tag (last visited Apr. 29, 2008); see
also Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes
and Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA
L. REV. 735, 748-50 (2000).
133 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P Merges, Opinion Letter As to the Patentability
of Certain Inventions Associated with the ldentification of Partial eDNA Sequences, 23
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 2, 13-20 (1995).
134 The PTO tightened the utility requirement in 2001, requiring that utility to be
"substantial," 'specific," and "credible." In 2005, the Federal Circuit finally held EST
patents invalid for lack of utility. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005); and
supra Part III.B.7. An accurate figure for the number of EST patents is hard to estimate
because the specific term rarely appears in patent applications. See infra Part IV.A.
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researchers find a chemical candidate for pharmaceuticals, it is advisable
to test against all cell receptors in the human body that might interact with
the candidate, so as to learn as much as possible about the therapeutic
functioning and side effects before clinical trials on volunteers commence.
This screening not only saves clinical trial expenses, but is also better for
the safety and health of those who volunteer for the trials. When those cell
receptors are patented and controlled by various patentees, however, it is
difficult to secure all of the licenses necessary for the screening. 135
Another problem arises with reach-through rights. 136 This is a
licensing mode commonly used for research tools. A research tool cannot
turn into a commercial product itself, at least in some respects, but it can
provide valuable assistance for the research or commercialization of other
suitable candidates. Inventors of research tools nonetheless strive to
maximize their return from patent license, particularly because a
substantial portion of them are cash-starved biotechnology firms and
universities. On the other hand, the supposed licensees-researchers and
developers-do not have the financial resources to satisfy inventors on the
instant. Reach-through rights are one of the compromises that emerged. In
this way, research-tool inventors receive some rights to the results of the
research or development, in exchange for the license. The common types
of arrangements in this category include sharing revenues of the research
results (reach-through royalties), exclusive or nonexclusive licenses
(grantback license), prepublication review, and prior approval on licensing
the result. 137 If the approval right is accepted, the research tool patentee
will have a veto power against the contemplated license.
When confronting the anticommons as described above, a
biomedical scientist may have to secure patent licenses from various
owners in order to continue his or her own research. This task could be
burdensome and time-consuming. Furthermore, denial of any
indispensable license will cancel out all other licenses the scientist has
already obtained, meaning that a single patentee may have the power to
determine the fate of the research. 138 Even if all patentees agree on the
licensing, the aggregate amount of royalties may well exceed the
135 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 699.
136 See generally id at 699 700.
137 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reaching Through the Genome, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 209, 214-17 (F. Scott Kieffed., 2003).
13' Based on the dynamics of the computer and semiconductor industries, Carl Shapiro
indicated that the patent thicket, which refers to too many fragmented patents on the
same product or its manufacturing process, might give rise to strategic holdouts.
Patentees would refrain from enforcing their patent rights until the infringing product
is already on the market, so as to charge a disproportionate amount for royalties by
virtue of the manufacturer's reluctance to rip off the product and throw away all
investments already made. See Shapiro, supra note 131, at 121, 124-26. This kind of
holdout is also possible in the biomedical sector, although there is no sign that it has
already occurred.
31
WANG: BIOMEDICAL UPSTREAM PATENTING AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
10 YALE J.L. & TECH 251 (2008)
affordable range for an academic scientist, who usually has only a limited
budget for research expenditures. This situation is comparable to having
too many tollbooths on one parcel of land. Various reach-through requests
may also give rise to conflicts and deadlocks in licensing negotiations.
Any of these events may lead to abandoning the research project
altogether or shifting to an alternative approach that might not be as
promising as the original.
2. High Transaction Costs
The reason why patent proliferation would generate such a dire
outcome is embedded in a number of factors. 139 One of them is high
transaction costs. The sheer number of relevant patents and patentees in a
research or commercialization project spawns the burden of reviewing
patent claims and negotiating necessary licenses. 14 A large portion of
owners and users for upstream patents are public universities and research
institutes, which have limited capacities for patent negotiations. Yet
patentees have no interest in standardizing the terms of their licenses, as
manufacturers do on contracts for most commodities. Here, the inventors
seek to extract all of the possible value of their patents from future
downstream applications. This preference gives rise to highly engaged and
forward-looking negotiations between the parties, which compounds the
difficulty of negotiation, insufficient resources thus leading to huge
delays. 141
Furthermore, research tools comprise a wide variety of
technologies, ranging from research targets like cell receptors and drug
candidates, to ordinary research tools such as reagents, to other equipment
and inputs like research instruments and bioinformatics. No single
distribution scheme or terms of contract can accommodate all of these
tools at the same time. Finally, heterogeneous interests between different
types of inventors and licensees, and the divergent time frames thus
arising for innovation returns, which will be elaborated on next, generate
disparate expectations between parties, hampering consensus and
contributing to possible breakdowns in negotiation.
3. Heterogeneous Interests.
The diversified nature of patentees and licensees in the area of
upstream biomedical patents fosters divergent interests, which lead to
139 See generally Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 700-0 1.
140 For a description of the quantity of biotechnology patents, see supra text
accompanying notes 7-8; for a discussion of the extent of the impact it generates on
research and commercialization, see infra Section IV.C.
141 See, e.g., John P Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on
Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 314-17
(Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
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different strategies and agendas in follow-on development. A review of
the contrasting interests implicated in the realm of biomedical patents can
help explain the disparities between actors in this field.
(A) Public/Private
Some patentees or licensees, such as the NIH or the National
Science Foundation (NSF), are public agencies which shoulder the
mission of promoting the national progress of science. They would like to
see an open exchange of scientific discoveries and information, including
patent licenses at fair prices, in order to foster the dynamic accumulation
of human knowledge. Private companies, on the other hand, set profit
maximization as their primary goal. They have no interest in an open
licensing scheme that could hurt the prospective financial benefit of their
patents. In the same vein, they are also more aware of potential patent
infringement internally than are public agencies and institutions. 142
(B) Upstream/Downstream
Patentees or licensees from academia and the biotechnology
industry are largely located upstream and work predominantly on the
research end of the biomedical sector. They are cash-starved and in favor
of exclusive licenses so as to maximize their revenue from royalties. If
licensees are positioned upstream and are short of cash, upstream
patentees will seek reach-through royalties or grantback licenses. 143 On the
other hand, licensees tend to spurn the idea of grantback licenses for their
future research results, as these interfere with potential lucrative
transactions with their own exclusive licensees. Universities are reluctant
to offer the option for patentees to take an exclusive license in exchange
for an incoming license for research tools. They generally reserve this
degree of exclusivity to full research sponsorship. Owing to this disparity
across the table, the negotiations between upstream entities are particularly
protracted and it is difficult to reach an agreement desirable to both
sides. 144
Pharmaceutical companies, in contrast, are primarily located
downstream, favoring widely available licenses to and from other
biomedical institutions. This enables them to reduce royalty expenses and
vest more resources in their major work on follow-on research and
commercialization. For incoming research tools, they prefer to pay fixed,
142 An informal research exception exists for universities and research institutes. See infra
Section IV.D. In addition, state-owned institutes are entitled to sovereign immunity in
patent infringement suits. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
143 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is
This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 223, 246 (Rochelle
Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
144 Id. at 244-46.
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up-front royalties instead of giving up a share of revenue from the end
product, which could be worth billions of dollars. 145
As for their own upstream patents, they also prefer licensing them
out so as to increase their chances of identifying lucrative end products.
The main concern of pharmaceutical companies is preserving the
opportunity to deploy the full potential of their patents. First of all, the
outcome of the licensee's research might end up being a competing
product. The licensed research might also discover a new therapeutic use
for the claimed invention in treating another indication, or conversely, it
might find something that constrains or undermines the strength of the
company's patents. Second, without prior prohibitions, the licensee might
use the claimed invention in a project sponsored by competitors of the
firm. Third, the licensed research might generate information destructive
to the company's products, such as suggesting health risks or undesirable
side effects. Correspondingly, pharmaceutical firms usually confine their
license to particular projects conducted in certain laboratories and disallow
other uses without prior authorization. Pre-publication review and
limitations on the use of the research data are also frequently seen in their
license agreements. When they have reason to believe the research will
lead to something valuable down the road, drug companies will seek to
preserve an option to obtain a patent or grantback license. 146
(C) Scientist/Institution
For scientists in academia, the primary goal is to win the race
against other fellow scientists for priority in scientific findings. Their main
concern about patent licensing is obtaining state-of-the-art technology as
soon as possible whenever they need it in their research. As for the
obligations that come with patent licenses, they are averse to accepting
prepublication review because the requirement would delay their pursuit
of scientific priority. Beyond this, academic scientists do not care as much
about other types of obligations, such as reach-through royalties or
grantback licenses on prospect research results. 147 Though academic
scientists may also be concerned about commercializing the inventions
derived from their research, they generally will not go that far until they
have accomplished their end results.
The interests of academic institutions, however, are not always
aligned with those of research scientists. Besides academic superiority,
institutions are also in pursuit of increased funding and improving their
overall reputations. Patent licensing has been seen as a way of bringing
monetary resources into academia, though considerable doubts have been
raised in this regard. 148 Nowadays, academic institutions usually have a
145 See Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 215.
146 See Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 244.
147 Id. at 239-40.
141 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1712-14; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
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technology transfer office that is engaged in patent licensing for the
purpose of fundraising in the form of royalty revenues, private research
grants, and industrial partnerships. Charged with this goal, the office
usually has different priorities than those of the research scientists. 149 Like
its counterparts in industry, the office seeks to maximize licensing revenue
by crafting reach-through requirements and other obligations, which
demand highly involved, case-by-case negotiations. This practice causes
considerable delay for research scientists in securing necessary licenses
for their research.
In contrast, technology transfer offices usually consult against
scientists at their institutions accepting reach-through obligations, as this
will hopefully preserve the commercial value of prospective research
achievements for more lucrative transactions in the future.150 These
opposing attitudes towards incoming and outgoing patents may halt
license negotiations for an indeterminate amount of time. With much
deeper pockets than individual scientists, the institution is also more
concerned about patent infringement litigation. This inclination may lead
to the regulation of scientific research, particularly when there is fear of a
lawsuit developing. Needless to say, scientists do not favor such
regulations, which may considerably confine their research latitude.
4. Cognitive Bias and Evaluation Difficulty
It is commonplace for human beings to have a self-serving bias,
namely to overestimate themselves or their contributions to joint work in
comparison to their colleagues. This bias flows from selective, role-
dependent information processing. 151 People with this bias tend to mistake
what is in their interest with what is fair. This feature may compound the
disagreement between negotiating parties, giving rise to suspicions that
one party is taking advantage of the other. Cognitive bias thus is a frequent
reason for bargaining impasse or breakdowns. 152 Downstream
pharmaceutical companies are used to considering that upstream entities
will fail to realize the risks and uncertainties in follow-on research and
commercialization and thus ask for too much during license negotiations.
Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs 289,
300 (2003).
149 Nonetheless the technology transfer office in certain institutes, such as MIT, Harvard
and Stanford, does share the scientist's view and refrain from patenting certain
discoveries like ESTs, cell receptors or SNPs, which are remote from specific
commercial development or of use to many developers. See Rai, supra note 26, at 112-
13.
150 See Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 240-4 1.
151 See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role
of Self-Serving Biases, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 355, 360-61 (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000).
152 Id. at 355-62.
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On the other hand, biotechnology firms and academic scientists usually
devote themselves to a small circle of research and are optimistic about
their chances of succeeding in the downstream market. The difficulty of
evaluation compounds this discrepancy. Given the high uncertainty
inherent in biomedical innovation, there are hardly any appreciable rules
for objective evaluation before pharmaceutical development is concluded.
Parties may therefore stick to their respective biases, diverging
significantly on the commercial value of the pharmaceutical research and
on how to apportion the value to the license. 153
Moreover, information asymmetry exists between upstream and
downstream agents. Each possesses only part of the information that is
necessary for the evaluation. Upstream entities know more about the
patented invention and cutting-edge biotechnological research, while
pharmaceutical companies are well informed in chemistry, drug candidate
screening, clinical testing, distribution and promotion. Partial information
aggravates the self-serving bias and generates overreaction to incidents of
high salience but low probability. 154 Consequently, patentees and licensees
might be too cautious to forge a mutually acceptable license agreement.
5. Counter-Argument and Rebuttal
The argument above may be countered by the fact that the
proliferation of patents is not a condition that has occurred only in the
biomedical sector. Today, almost every industry employs a large number
of patented inputs, especially those that manufacture composite products,
such as automobiles. To date, there has been no indication in these
industries that the proliferation of patents results in an anticommons
problem that may hinder progress. 155 This counterargument, however,
misses the point. A large number of patents is not a sufficient condition for
the anticommons. Fragmented ownership by scores of patentees is another
indispensable condition. If a manufacturer and its allies own many patents
on a specific product, it might not be necessary for them to spend a lot of
time and energy negotiating the license. Patent portfolios, if crafted well,
could deter aggressive enforcement strategies and assure the manufacturer
of its ability to produce and sell the product without undue interference. 156
In addition, the competition dynamics are quite different in the
biomedical sector than in other industries. For example, in the automobile
industry, there are many competitors in every submarket. This competition
suppresses the price that the manufacturers could feasibly charge. As a
result, the primary approach for augmenting profits is to sell more units at
153 See Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 247.
154 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 701.
155 Kieff, supra note 53, at 720.
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a fixed price. In the pharmaceutical industry, a downstream market of the
biomedical sector, competition is much more confined. During the life of a
major pharmaceutical patent, viable competition is reduced to limited
cases where non-infringing imitative drugs ("me-too" drugs) are
successfully developed. 157 The lack of competition gives the patentee an
opportunity to charge a high price for an innovative drug, especially a
blockbuster-the most noted source of profits in the industry. 158
Consequently, upstream patentees are not willing to set a fixed price for
their inventions to enlarge the number of licenses. They will search every
possible candidate for the next blockbuster and try to squeeze as many
benefits as they can from the astonishing rent that arises due to the
dominant position that a pharmaceutical patent may hold in the
downstream market. As a result, this causes fragmented upstream patent
owners to act similar to toll collectors, as they are eager for harsh terms of
license.
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley imply that the prospect theory and the
anticommons theory can coexist. 159 This, in fact, is an illusion. In the case
of mineral claims-the model for the patent system according to the
prospect theorists, there are no overlapping claims. Neither party can
claim the same parcel of land over another. But patents are different. As
long as they are new and not obvious, given the state of the art, patents can
be granted within the literal scope of another patent. If patent law remains
unchanged, upstream patents with a broad scope will only create more
stacking in patent ownership, rather than diminishing stacking. Made by
either independent inventors or the original patentees, improvement
patents will still spring up on the top of upstream patents. Enlarged patent
scopes may, in fact, create more overlaps. What Burk and Lemley actually
recommended was to tighten up the non-obviousness standard and to
simultaneously loosen the disclosure requirement in biotechnology, so as
to combine inventions with different but interchangeable structure
variations into a single patent. This proposal, however, is more like an
anticommons reform than a prospect one.
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE PROSPECT THEORY GETS OUT OF THE
PICTURE
There are still some expressed objections to the anticommons
theory, asserting that even if this theory may hold true in the biomedical
sector, viable solutions already exist for scientists to overcome its inherent
difficulties. Informal norms, collective rights groups, patent pools, and
157 See Fabio Pammolli & Massimo Riccaboni, Market Structure and Drug Innovation,
23 REALTH AFF. 48, 49-50 (2004).
158 See, e.g., Service, supra note 124, at 1796-97.
159 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575,
1683 (2003).
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cross licensing are the possibilities that are frequently mentioned. 16 This
issue involves the real-world licensing practices that will be discussed in
Part IV, and this Article will return to the same issue later in Section IV.D
and Section V.A. On balance, after a thorough review of the application of
the two primary theories in the biomedical arena, the anticommons theory
is obviously more persuasive than the prospect theory. The prospect
theory suffers from a number of serious flaws, such as providing excessive
incentives and protection of innovation, while ignoring the nature of
scientific research and the importance of competition in both innovation
and the marketplace. Accepting the anticommons theory as a starting
point, this Article will proceed in the next Part to the world of patent
practice, exploring the reasons for why the anticommons problem has not,
thus far, been a major concern in the biomedical field.
IV. THE REALITY OF FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH AND
COMMERCIALIZATION
Theories often provide us the sharp insights that are necessary for
penetrating a convoluted factual complex. Yet no matter how solid the
foundation of these theories may be, at the end of the day we must return
to the empirical world to verify their teachings. In this Part, I will delve
into the empirical studies that exist in the realm of biomedical patents,
examining when precisely the anticommons arises and the contour of the
scientific landscape in which it appears.
A. THE STACKING OF EST AND SNP PATENTS IS NOT A DRASTIC
PROBLEM
EST patents are one of the main concerns for many anticommons
theorists, 16 1 although to a large extent, these concerns have been curbed. It
is difficult to quantify how many EST patents have actually been granted.
Because ESTs are defined by the way in which the materials were
obtained, not by their substance or structure, patent applications rarely use
the term "EST" or "expressed sequence tag" to describe the invention.
162
160 See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 53, at 724 27.
161 See, e.g., John H. Barton, Patents, Genomics, Research, and Diagnostics, 77 AcAD.
MED. 1339, 1339-42 (2002); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the
Genome Project. Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK 163, 163-66
(1994); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 699; Arti K. Rai, Genome Patents. A Case
Study in Patenting Research Tools, 77 AcAD. MED. 1368, 1370-71 (2002) [hereinafter
Rai, Genome Patents]; Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual
Property Rights. A Reply to Kieff, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 707, 708, 710-11 (2001)
[hereinafter Rai, Reply]; Rai, supra note 26, at 112-25, 125-26, 134, 140-43. Burk and
Lemley also noted that: "Anticommons theory was designed with DNA in mind, and
seems to work most effectively there." Burk & Lemley, supra note 159, at 1627.
162NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 91, at 33; Holman & Munzer, supra note
132, at 754 n.46.
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This practice makes it difficult for even the PTO to keep track of the
accurate number of EST patents. Some commentators believe that very
few EST patents have actually been granted. 163 It is certain, however, that
over one million applications claiming one or more ESTs have been
filed, 164 and many of them are as long as 2000 pages. 165 In 1996, Incyte
Pharmaceuticals alone filed 400,000 ESTs with the PTO.166 For a period
of time, the PTO looked favorably on EST patents. In 1998, John Doll,
then the Director of Biotechnology Examination at the PTO, indicated that
ESTs might possess utility in areas such as chromosome identification and
gene mapping. 167 This opinion suggests that the PTO accepted the
patentability of ESTs.
That said, patent grants for ESTs have been reined in lately. First,
the 2001 Utility Guidelines emphasize that for a patent to be granted, it
must possess at least one practical utility. The Guidelines require that the
alleged use be "substantial", in addition to being "specific" and "credible,"
as stipulated in the 1995 Utility Guidelines. 168 To constitute a substantial
use, the asserted utility cannot be analogous to deploying "a complex
invention as landfill."' 169 More recently in In re Fisher, the Federal Circuit
further invalided EST patents for lacking specific and substantial utility. 170
Second, prior to these visible changes, the PTO was already
becoming less lenient towards biotechnology applications. In 1999, the
Office published a proposal of the new utility guidelines for public
comments, 171 which was much tighter than the liberal 1995 Guidelines.
This proposal was ultimately finalized in the 2001 Guidelines. From the
same year, the number of biotechnology patents issued per year began to
decrease from its high point of 5977 such patents granted in 1998.172 In the
six years that followed, the number of patents granted in this area dropped
29%, while during the period of 2000 to 2004, the applications for
biotechnology patents increased by 46%. 173 Yet the PTO's limited
163 NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 91, at 33.
164 Martin Enserink, Patent Office May Raise the Bar on Gene Claims, 287 SCIENCE
1196, 1196 (2000); Tom Hollon, Gene Patent Revisions to Remove Some
Controversies, 6 NATURE MED. 362, 362 (2000).
165 Holman & Munzer, supra note 132, at 753-54.
166 See Eliot Marshall, Patent Office Faces 90-Year Backlog, 272 SCIENCE 643 (1996).
167 John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 SCIENCE 689, 689-90 (1998).
161 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098 (Jan. 5, 2001).
169 Id.
170 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For a discussion of this case, see supra Part 111.B.7.
171 Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines; Request for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg.
71440 (Dec. 21, 1999).
172 Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 8, at 1687.
173 Id; The Patent System: Today and Tomorrow Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property of the S. Com. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) [hereinafter
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resources do not provide an adequate explanation for this trend. The
examination of patent applications runs on a first-come, first-served basis.
The increase in applications would normally produce more backlogs and a
long prosecution time due to the prolonged period of waiting for the next
available examiner. 174 However, this might not impact the number of
patents granted annually. A logical explanation is that the PTO changed its
generous attitude in 1999, adopting a more stringent stance on
biotechnology patents, hence increasing the rejection rate in the years
since. 175
Finally, the DNA sequences and other genomic information
discovered in the Human Genome Project are placed in GenBank, a free
public database open to anyone with internet access, so as to facilitate the
pervasive use of genomic data while decreasing transaction costs. 176 There
are still private companies that provide genomic databases loaded with
additional patented genes and information on the properties of assorted
DNA sequences. Although scientists find these expensive commercial
databases quite productive in their research, 177 GenBank and other public
databases ensure access to critical human genome information, such as
ESTs. This is especially important for small start-up companies and
university laboratories that have very tight budgets. 
178
Single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) are another primary
concern of the anticommons camp. 179 They are variations of DNA
sequences where a single nucleotide (A, T, C, or G) in the genome is
altered. 180 SNPs may be the genetic sources of personal disposition to
Hearing] (statement of Jon Dudas, Under Secretary for Intellectual Property,
Department of Commerce).
174 Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 8, at 1691.
175 Another possible explanation might be the increase in "super-sized" applications.
Currently, a small portion of applications contains a large number of claims.
Approximately 25% of the claims now reviewed by the PTO come from only 7% of
the patent applications received. Hearing, supra note 173, at 9. There is, however, no
evidence indicating an increase in this group of applications.
176 Human Genome Project, Genetics and Patenting, available at http://www.ornl.gov/sci
/techresources/Human Genome/elsi/patents.shtml (last visited Apr. 24, 2008). The
Human Genome Project, a public consortium funded chiefly by the NIH for the task of
human genome sequencing, was established partially in order to inhibit genomic firms
from claiming copyrights for the DNA sequences they discovered. See J. Andrew
Maniko, Note, Who Should Know? The Disclosure Debate over Genetic Information,
26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 151, 157 n.42 (2001).
177 Commercial genomic databases often cost tens of millions dollars and sometimes even
more than $100 million. See Genomic's Wheelers and Dealers, 275 SCIENCE 774, 774-
75 (1997).
178 See Walsh et al., supra note 141, at 301-02.
179 See sources cited in supra note 161.
180 NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 91, at 92.
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certain diseases and thus could be useful in treating a variety of illnesses.
These genetic variations have a demonstrated ability as gene markers to
greatly accelerate the identification of the targeted DNA sequence. 181 They
may also play a substantial role in the formation of complex diseases that
involve a plurality of factors, such as multiple genes, lifestyle choices, and
living environments. Additionally, SNPs could influence patients'
reactions to specific medicines, which would give these minor variations
in the human genome great potential for designing personalized
medicine. 182
Given these unique features, SNPs became an important subject of
upstream investigation after the conclusion of the Human Genome Project.
Following the steps of the Project and GenBank, ten of the largest
pharmaceutical companies and the Wellcome Trust founded the SNP
Consortium in 1999, which aims to release to the public domain the SNP
discoveries made under their sponsorship, in order to forestall the genomic
companies' attempts to win patents on SNPs. 183 This release provides
instant, free, and equal access to all drug companies, biotech firms, and
academics. The Consortium also seeks patents for these released SNPs, so
that biotech firms can no longer patent and sell these DNA snippets. 184 A
large-scale collaboration like this greatly alleviates the danger that SNP
patents will impede the progress of biomedical research.
B. THE RESEARCH GROUND IS WIDE OPEN
In addition, the research ground of biomedicine is wide open and
contains many different potential ways of confronting the various illnesses
that affect mankind. There are a variety of disease pathways and
therapeutic targets to be explored, which outnumber the amount that
current researchers could possibly process. 185 Though the advance of
181 A research team at Glaxo Wellcome tested the performance of the SNP markers. Dr.
Roses and his team at Duke University spent several years and finally located a
specific version of a gene, APOe, which disposed people to Alzheimer's disease. The
team redid the research process at Glaxo Wellcome with SNP markers and came to the
same result in five months. See Robert Langreth et al., DNA Dreams: Big Drug Firms
Discuss Linking Up to Pursue Disease-Causing Genes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1999, at
Al.
112 Human Genome Project, supra note 176.
183 Justin Gillis, Drug Companies, Gene Labs to Join Forces; Collaboration Aims to
Probe Genetic Difference-Without Proprietary Interests, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1999,
at E01; Nicholas Wade, 10 Drug Makers Join in Drive to Find Diseases' Genetic
Roots, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 1999, at A27. These genomic companies include Genset
SA, Incyte Corp., and Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Langreth et al., supra note
181, at Al. For an analysis of the formation of the SNP Consortium, see infra text
accompanying notes 183-184.
114 Langreth et al., supra note 181; Genetics and Patenting, supra note 176; Wade, supra
note 183.
185 See generally David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy,
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molecular biology has furthered our understanding of the genetic origins
of human diseases, genetic makeup is not the only key necessary to
unlocking the secrets of human ailments. Rather, genes do not sustain
fixed relations with human health. As a matter of fact, only a weak causal
link exists between a person's genetic composition and his or her
susceptibility to disease. 
186
The primary reason that genes are not as predominant in the
development of diseases as was initially thought lies in a class of
intervening factors that stand in the way of correlations between specific
phenotypes and particular genotypes. 17 Many critical processes that
control the expression of genes or manipulate the activities of proteins are
out of the hands of DNA sequences. 188 The existence of other genes in a
person's genome also affects the function of his or her genes. For instance,
the natural redundancy of human genes has made most mutations, which
contain genetic diseases to a large extent, recessive. 18 The human
biological systems are not just reflections of gene makeup. Rather, the
human body operates more like a complex network, comprised of multiple
layers of sub-networks that interact intensively with one another. The
structures of the biological systems and the dynamics between various
biological pathways again have a significant influence on the function of
the genes. 190 There are even inheritable biological traits that are not
encoded in DNA sequences. These epigenetic phenomena transform the
expression of genes and are transmitted across generations. 191
Besides these internal factors, the environment also plays an
important role in the cause of disease. 192 Nowadays, two-thirds of the
deaths in the United States are attributable to heart disease or cancer.
Scientists have found only weak and incoherent genetic signals for the
underlying conditions, such as hypertension and diabetes. 193 Non-genetic
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985 (2005).
186 Id. at 1009.
187 See, e.g., Kenneth M. Weiss & Joseph D. Terwilliger, How Many Diseases Does It
Take to Map a Gene with SNPs?, 26 NATURE GENETICS 151, 151 fig. 1 (2000).
... Adelman, supra note 185, at 1007 n.115; Alan E. Guttmacher & Francis S. Collins,
Genomic Medicine A Primer, 347 N. ENG. J. MED. 1512, 1514 (2002).
189 See, e.g., John L. Hartman IV et al., Principles for the Buffering of Genetic Variation,
291 SCIENCE 1001, 1004 (2001).
190 Adelman, supra note 185, at 1008 n.116; U. Alon, Biological Networks: The Tinkerer
As an Engineer, 301 SCIENCE 1866, 1866 (2003); Hiroaki Kitano, Systems Biology: A
Brief Overview, 295 SCIENCE 1662, 1662 (2002).
191 Alan P Wolffe & Marjori A. Matzke, Epigenetics: Regulation Through Repression,
286 SCIENCE 481 (1999); Guttmacher & Collins, supra note 188, at 1513-14.
192 See Kenneth M. Weiss & Anne V. Buchanan, Evolution by Phenotype: A Biomedical
Perspective, 46 PERSP. BiO. MED. 159, 174-75 (2003).
193 Richard S. Cooper & Bruce M. Psaty, Genomics and Medicine: Distraction,
Incremental Progress, or the Dawn of a New Age?, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 576,
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factors, however, might account for 80-90% of the risks of these serious
diseases. This conclusion is drawn from the observation that the affection
rates differed from five-fold to one-hundred-fold among different
populations, yet when people moved from low-risk countries to high-risk
ones, their affection rates routinely aligned with those in the new
environment. 194
As a result, there exist numerous targets for biomedical researchers
to explore, even in the confines of the same disease. When confronted
with blockages in possible targets, scientists can usually turn to alternative
targets on the disease pathway. Consequently, patents normally do not
pose a serious constraint on competition for new innovations. As one
research manager in a pharmaceutical firm stated in an interview, "We
have more targets than we have chemists to work on them." 
195
Indeed, defects in single genes may give rise to over 10,000
illnesses in humans. These single-gene disorders, which are caused by just
one flaw in a gene, are nevertheless very rare and affect only 1% of the
population. 196 Taking relatively few examples like this into consideration,
it is fair to say that for biomedical research, the problem of the
anticommons and other types of blockages may still exist, but only in
some specific places.
C. BLOCKAGE DOES OCCUR IN CERTAIN PLACES
In a mid-sized survey, Walsh, Arora, and Cohen found that the
biomedical industry generally considers the number of patents that they
face in the course of research and commercialization to be manageable,
although the number is much larger than before. 197 The interviews they
conducted with ten industry respondents show that at the onset of a
research project, a considerable number of patents-sometimes in the
hundreds-may come to the researchers' attention. After examination and
culling, five to twenty pieces of patents may stand out as requiring
intensive investigation. Finally, up to approximately six patents may prove
to be relevant and in need of a license agreement and sometimes even full-
fledged negotiations. 19 On the other hand, academia does not have the
same level of resources as does the private industry to cope with patent
investigation and negotiation on this scale. Academic researchers instead
577 (2003).
194 Walter C. Willett, Balancing Life-Style and Genomics Research for Disease
Prevention, 296 SCIENCE 695, 695 96 (2002).
195 Walsh et al., supra note 141, at 304.
196 Richard Twyman, Single Gene Disorders, The Human Genome, Apr. 16, 2003,
http://genome.wellcome.ac.uk/doc-WTD 020848.html.
197 Walsh et al., Research Tool, supra note 141, at 295. This may be the only
comprehensive survey conducted on this topic thus far.
19 Id. at 294 95,316.
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rely on the informal research exception to keep their work going, an issue
that will be discussed in Section IV.D.
Surely there are some places where patents have piled up, such as
in the case of Golden Rice. This is a genetically modified variety of rice
rich in Vitamin A, which was developed for the 100 million people who
live in developing countries and suffer from Vitamin A deficiency. 199 It
was estimated that as of 2000, at least seventy patents in the world, held
by thirty-two different entities, applied to this strain of rice or its
formulation process. In individual countries, the numbers of patents
ranged from forty-four (the United States), to the upper thirties (European
Union countries), to around ten (Brazil, China, and Vietnam), while some
countries have no patents on Golden Rice (Argentina, Bangladesh, and
Nigeria).200 Because of the charitable nature of developing and growing
the rice, patent assignees such as Syngenta, Monsanto, and Bayer are now
providing royalty-free licenses for farmers who earn less than $10,000 per
year. 201 Naturally, the primary market for Golden Rice is poor consumers
and farmers in developing countries, meaning that there is little
commercial value for multinational companies. But were Golden Rice a
lucrative biomedical product, the story about patent licensing would be
quite different.
Moreover, most scientific discoveries and innovations build on
20220past findings. Biomedical research is no exception in this regard.20 3
Although in theory the landscape for innovation is wide open, unbounded,
and dispersed with a variety of research opportunities, the breadth and
depth of currently available knowledge may nevertheless confine the
vision of scientists. At times biomedical researchers have to follow the
approaches of their predecessors, because they might be the only strategies
that are known to be promising. In order for scientists to have broad
visions and reach specific discoveries, they need the shoulders of giants to
stand on. And it is the accumulation of scientific findings that plays the
role of these giants.
204
199 CIPR, supra note 90, at 129.
200 R. DAVID KRYDER ET AL., THE INTELLECTUAL AND TECHNICAL PROPERTY
COMPONENTS OF PRO-VITAMIN A RICE (GOLDENRCE TM ): A PRELIMINARY FREEDOM-
To-OPERATE REVIEW 8 tbl.1, 33-36 (2000), available at
http://www.isaaa.org/Resources/publications/briefs/20/download/isaaa -brief-20-
2000.pdf.
201 CIPR, supra note 90, at 129.
202 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age ?f Software and
Biotechnology 4 (U. Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 35,
1995), available at http:// www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_26-
50/35.KWD.IP.pdf.
203 Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and
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The patents for mutations on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes
exemplify the cumulative characteristic of biomedical research. These
mutations may give rise to breast cancer. In 1974, Mary Claire King
started her long effort to locate and sequence the BRCA1 gene. In 1990
she identified the general location of the gene, a region on chromosome
seventeen that contains approximately 1000 genes. 205 This breakthrough
induced a classic scientific race for the gene. Besides King, the European
Breast Cancer Consortium and Myriad Genetics, led by Dr. Mark
Skolnick, also competed for the significant discovery. Finally Myriad
Genetics, backed by the state government of Utah, which has massive
genealogical resources and intensive tumor records, first sequenced the
20gene in August 1994. 06 The company filed for a patent, claiming the
mutations of the gene and the nucleic acid probes that specifically
207hybridize to these mutations. In December 1995, Myriad announced
that it had successfully sequenced the BRCA2 gene, for which it also
claimed a patent. 2
0 8
The BRCA1 patent embraces the compounds that may be made or
used in the course of applying the invention for diagnostic or therapeutic
purposes, including genetic tests for cancer or gene therapy.209 Although
the unearthing of BRCA1 and BRCA2 was achieved thanks to the prior
accomplishments of Mary Claire King, Myriad Genetics did not provide
any latitude for allowing independent scientists to follow up on this issue.
Myriad Genetics licenses the patent to over twelve organizations,
including teaching hospitals, medical schools, and cancer clinics to do
cancer screening for only a few known mutations. Myriad disallows all
other genetic tests based on its inventions, including sequencing, except
for those conducted in its own laboratories. In 2001, academics conducting
an NIH-funded research project paid $1200 for a Myriad test, while
ordinary patients were charged $2680 for the same test.2 10
Myriad's restrictive licensing policy has stifled the investigation of
sections in BRCA1 and BRCA2 that still puzzle the biomedical science
community. The policy deprives scientists and their students of the
opportunity to learn the screening procedure and genetics of BRCA1 and
BRCA2, thus hindering the development of their expertise in this area. By
205 Matthew Rimmer, Myriad Genetics: Patent Law and Genetic Testing, 25 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REv. 20, 21 (2003); Karen Van Kampen, Owning the Code, NAT'L POST Bus.,
Sept. 1, 2005, at 56.
216 Rimmer, supra note 205, at 21-22; Van Kampen, supra note 205, at 56.
207 U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995).
208 Van Kampen, supra note 205, at 56.
209 '473 Patent, at [57].
210 Kimberly Blanton, Corporate Takeover Exploiting the US Patent System, A Single
Company Has Gained Control over Genetic Research and Testing for Breast Cancer
And Scientists, Doctors, and Patients Have to Play by its Rules, BOSTON GLOBE MAG.,
Feb. 22, 2002, at 10.
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requiring independent investigators to submit their samples to its "testing
plant," Myriad gains access to clinical information that takes these
scientists decades to accumulate. Each sample enriches Myriad's
collection of DNA and patient profiles, which allows the company to take
even more control over this area of research.211
Myriad's licensing policy may have delayed the progress of studies
about breast cancer. There have been cases where hereditary breast cancer
was apparently passed down in families. In one such case, the Myriad test
nevertheless came back negative. Because no other institute in the United
States performs advanced research in this field, the family went to the
Institute Curie in Paris to seek further help. The institute confirmed that
the mother and the daughter both suffered from "big deletions" in BRCA1
or BRCA2. Missing sections of DNA on these two genes were just coming
to scientists' attention in the United States, and thus were not detectable
by the Myriad test.212 In the words of Dr. Debra Leonard, the director of a
molecular pathology laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania, "It took
a long time for the deletion issue to come up [in America]. Maybe it




The blocking effect of proliferating upstream patents arises in two
ways. For research targets, it comes from the prevention of competition,
which keeps independent researchers away from the follow-on
development campaign. Research targets are objects of the research,
which can be roughly divided into two categories: therapeutic targets,
including drug targets, and drug candidates. 214 Therapeutic targets include
any gene, cell receptor, enzyme, or other protein which is implicated in the
disease pathway and is thus a plausible locus for medical intervention.
215
The Cox-2 enzyme in the Searle case,216 the CD34 cell receptor in the
Cel/Pro case, 217 and the CCR5 cell receptor involved in AIDS treatment2
18
211 Id.; Rimmer, supra note 205, at 27; Van Kampen, supra note 205, at 56.
212 Blanton, supra note 210, at 56.
213 Id.
214 Since certain research targets, such as therapeutic targets, will not be represented in
the final products, those research inputs can be research tools as well. When first
discovered, drug candidates and therapeutic targets might fail to show the specific and
substantial utility that is required to secure a patent. In such case, the problems posed
by patent proliferation will not occur. For the current utility requirement standard, see
In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995); and In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
215 Cf Walsh et al., Research Tool, supra note 141, at 310 (referring to drug targets).
216 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See supra text
accompanying notes 76-78 for more detailed discussion.
217 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 303 (D. Del. 1996), aff'd in part,
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are all examples of therapeutic targets. The BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes
could also be targets of breast cancer therapy, and thus they are contained
in the same category. Drug candidates, which comprise the second
category, are compounds or molecules that have the potential to turn into
commercial medicines. The RGD peptide at issue in the Integra case is
part of this category.
219
No matter which category they belong to, research targets are key
building blocks for biomedical products and important milestones in the
development process. This explains why patent owners are used to
restraining access to these inputs. There is a prevalent exclusivity inflicted
on research targets in the biomedical sector, a phenomenon that
researchers repeatedly complain about.220 Approximately one-third of the
scientists, lawyers and business managers interviewed in a study expressed
concerns about patenting gene targets. 221 Individuals in academia and
private industry are similarly concerned about such patents.
222
The blockage that patentees impose on follow-on development
may appear in several forms. Patentees may eschew licensing entirely,
keeping research and commercialization of the claimed inventions all to
themselves. Or, they may merely allow exclusive licensees, as Baxter
Healthcare did in the CelPro case, 223 or very limited licensees with
restricted authorization, as demonstrated in Myriad's BRCA1 and BRCA2
licensing strategies. These restrictive measures may dislocate the patented
invention from capable hands that can fully explore its technological
possibilities.
As noted earlier, given the uncertainty and unpredictability of
scientific research, patent owners may rationally license their invention to
those who pay generous royalties, rather than to those who are most
capable of downstream innovation and development. 224 In addition, each
entity performing research has limits on its capacities, and also its own
specialized approaches to utilizing the invention. Every pharmaceutical
rev'd on other grounds, 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998). For a more detailed
discussion, see Avital Bar-Shalom & Rober Cook-Deegan, Patents and Innovation in
Cancer Therapeutics: Lessons from CellPro, 80 MILBANK Q. 637 (2002).
218 See supra text accompanying notes 90-95 for details regarding the CCR5 cell receptor.
219 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). See supra text
accompanying notes 79-85 for more detailed discussion.
221 In the survey by Walsh, Arora, and Cohen, respondents repeatedly referred to this
blockage in their interviews. Walsh et al., supra note 141, at 310.
221 id.
222 id.
223 Baxter was the exclusive sub-licensee of Johns Hopkins University on the My-10
patents and a plaintiff in the CellPro infringement lawsuit. For a discussion of the
CellPro case, see generally Bar-Shalom & Cook-Deegan, supra note 217.
224 See supra Subsections III.B.4 and III.B.6.
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company has its own library of compounds, usually kept secret, and each
library varies considerably from the next. 225 Small biotechnology firms
have more restricted capabilities and expertise. For example, the genomic
firm Geron has been thwarted in its pursuit of telomerase as a potential
target for cancer drugs. The company already owns an extensive patent
portfolio for telomerase. But stuck with the biological complexity
surrounding telomerase, the company has deferred considerably its
schedule for having the product ready for clinical trials. 226 Additionally,
the "coordination" or suppression of competition that the blockage creates
could further delay and delimit the progress of science and useful art.
227
At face value, exclusive licensing would be better than abstaining
from licensing. Nevertheless, exclusive licensing has its own problem:
double marginalization. This concept denotes a series of vertical
monopolies, a situation that is more pernicious than a single integrated
one. Each monopoly in this series is able to secure a monopolistic rent,
which, in aggregate would be much greater than a single integrated rent.
228
This problem could arise in the biomedical sector. 229 According to a
survey on the licensing of DNA patents owned by U.S. academic
institutions, nearly 46% of the patents were exclusively licensed either for
all fields or for individual fields of use.230 When researchers contact an
exclusive licensee for a sublicense, they face several monopolists,
including the one they are negotiating with, other exclusive licensees that
came before, and the patent owners-each of which is charging a
premium. This phenomenon could substantially increase license
expenditures, compounding the problem of royalty stacking caused by
patent proliferation and consuming the limited research budgets of
academic institutions and biotechnology start-ups.
225 Walsh et al., supra note 141, at 3 10-12.
226 Geron rescheduled the date for clinical trials to begin from 1998 to 2003. Id. at 312-
13; Jean Marx, Tackling Cancer at the Telomeres, 295 SCIENCE 2350 (2002). Arti Rai
called the ingenuity foregone because of blockage and the coordination created by
patentees as "creativity cost." Rai, supra note 26, at 136-41.
227 See supra Subsections 111.B.4-6.
228 Shapiro, supra note 131, at 123; cf Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property
Rights in Genetic Material, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT, supra note 137, at 153, 162-68 (arguing that double marginalization does not
apply to patents because the vertical relationships cannot be clearly established
between them).
229 See lain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 23
HEALTH AFF. 10, 19 (2004).
230 Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by US Academic Institutions. An
Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 31, 36, 37 fig.4 (2006).
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2. Pure Research Tools
For pure research tools, 231 the impact of upstream patent
proliferation comes from prolonged and complicated negotiations and
related burdens on downstream development. This is the realm in which
the anticommons wields its power and where transaction costs and
negotiation difficulties become reality. Normally, patent owners are, in
fact, willing to license their pure research tools. The problem results from
protracted, case-by-case license negotiations, which cause delay and
impose high costs for bringing in technologies or materials that scientists
require for their research. Over one-third of the respondents surveyed by
Walsh, Arora, and Cohen positively confirmed this situation.
232
Sometimes the delay or breakdown in negotiations even requires altering
the approach for tackling the research problem or changing the entire
research design. While researchers may try getting around the patents or
moving the project overseas, these solutions may come at the expense of
research efficiency, as they entail additional time, cost, and labor.
Reviewing the patents involved in the research and negotiating the license
agreement are also time consuming, complex, and costly. One attorney
affiliated with a large pharmaceutical company estimated that such work
cost the business $2 million per year.233
The problem of pure research tools is nevertheless much more
dramatic in certain cases. Commentators are used to asserting that
platform technology, which is instrumental in a variety of nonrivalous
lines of research, will be publicly authorized to interested scientists for a
moderate fee. This strategy seeks to maximize monetary returns, just as
Stanford University and the University of California did with the Cohen-
Boyer patent for basic DNA cloning techniques.234 Though this argument
is sensible in economics, some cases have gone precisely against this
prediction. A salient example comes from DuPont, which required
onerous reach-through rights for its Cre-lox technology. This invention
enables scientists to mark a targeted gene in a DNA sequence by the loxP
DNA, and then to cut off the gene from the sequence by using the Cre
enzyme. Currently, the technology is used primarily to raise knock-out
mice that lack specific genes. The more powerful application of the
23 For the distinction between research targets and pure research tools, see supra note 38.
232 Walsh et al., supra note 141, at 314.
233 Id. at 314-16. Walsh and his co-authors, however, did not consider that transaction
costs had already risen dramatically, because the growth rate of attorney input in the
biotechnology industry did not exceed the growth rate of research expenditures in the
same industry during the second half of 1990s.
234 See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 185, at 1023-29. For a brief introduction to the Cohen-
Boyer invention, see Sally Smith Hughes, Making Dollars Out of DNA: The First
Major Patent in Biotechnology and the Commercialization of Molecular Biology,
1974 1980, 92 Isis 541, 542 n.2 (2001); Biotechnology at 25: The Founders,
http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/Exhibits/Biotech /25.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
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technology in creating "conditional mutants," which drop specific genes
from specific cells in particular organs. 235 Both of the usages are
invaluable in designing animal models that fit the respective needs of in
vitro testing in individual projects.
Instead of generally licensing this technology, however, DuPont
asked the licensees for full-fledged reach-through rights on the scientific
findings reached through experimentation with test animals that were
genetically modified using the Cre-lox technique. Specifically, the
company required reach-through royalties, prepublication review, and
prior approval of the license or other transfers of the findings to third
parties. 236 Given the purely facilitative role of the technology in individual
research, some university licensing groups referred to this approach as the
"Steinway Piano model," comparing it to the demand for legal rights in
songs that are written on brand-name pianos. This unreasonableness
prompted dissent from research institutes such as Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT), University of California, the NIH, and the Jackson
Laboratory (the largest repository in the nation for test mice).23 v Finally,
the NIH solved the problem by striking a deal with DuPont to allow
nonprofit institutions to receive the technology from the NIH without any
charges or reach-through rights.
238
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR), an openly licensed platform
technology broadly used in amplifying DNA, also induced controversy
over its license policy. Researchers may obtain the license through buying
authorized thermal cyclers, Taq polymerase, and other authorized
enzymes. 239 The controversy, however, centered on the amount of royalty
fees, particularly the price of Taq polymerase. Some academics asserted
that the relatively high royalties made many experiments impossible for
them, especially in the field of molecular biology. 240 Small biotechnology
companies also complained about the difficulties they endured in
supporting the licensing costs of PCR.241
235 Naomi Freundlich, Cre-lox Controversy Divides Institutions, Prompts NIH Panel,
SIGNALS, June 12, 1998, http://www.signalsmag.com (search the website using the
article name, and follow the hyperlink thus retrieved).
236 Id.; NIH and DuPont Hammer Out Cre-lox Agreement, SIGNALS, Aug. 20, 1998,
http://www.signalsmag.com (search the website using the article name, and follow the
hyperlink thus retrieved)
23' Freundlich, supra note 235.
238 NIH and DuPont Hammer Out Cre-lox Agreement, supra note 236.
239 Shane Beck, Do You Have a License?. Products Licensed for PCR in Research
Applications, 12 SCIENTIST 21, 21 (1998).
24' Except for human genomic studies, which enjoy much more funding than other
subfields of molecular biology.
241 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NAT'LACADEMIES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND THE DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 43-45 (1997).
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Genetic tests represent another area that is rife with difficulties. In
a 2001 survey of American laboratories conducting DNA-based genetic
tests, 65% of respondents had been notified of possible patent
infringement and 25% of respondents had therefore ceased performing the
allegedly infringing tests. Addiitonally, 53% of respondents revealed that
they had determined not to develop or perform a test since patents had
already covered it.
242
Although the precise magnitude of the blockage that has arisen in
scientific progress remains to be seen,243 delays and additional costs have
accrued in the research and clinical application of genetic tests.
Unacceptable terms of license might be a reason for laboratories to
discontinue the patented tests that they originally performed. Most
respondents in the survey further confirmed that the effects of patents and
licenses on the cost, access, and development of the genetic tests were all
considered negative. They were equally divided as to whether patents had
enhanced the quality of genetic tests.244 The drawback of patenting in this
situation is so apparent that it could even cast doubt on the patents'
function of facilitating commercialization, a belief that bolstered the
enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act.245 As demonstrated by the case of
haemochromatosis, laboratories can be quick to make use of published
findings regarding gene-disease association, and thus are able to
successfully craft new genetic tests without patent incentives.
246
In summary, the anticommons has not occurred as widely in the
biomedical sector as the theory predicts. The main reason for this
discrepancy is the plurality of research targets positioned along disease
pathways. Although independent researchers may be able to use
alternative targets if patent owners have blocked the preferred one,
sometimes this avenue is simply not plausible because of the cumulative
nature of science. The blockage imposed by patentees on research targets
directly constrains competition in research and commercialization
following upstream patents, and thus negatively impacts the progress of
downstream innovation. On the other hand, the blockage imposed on pure
research tools creates substantial delays and costs to follow-on
development. These obstacles to innovation vindicate the necessity of a
242 Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical
Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY 3, 5 (2003).
243 The cases of BRCA1/BRCA2 and PCR, which is also a widely used genetic test,
substantiate the possibility of blockage created by patenting genetic tests.
244 Cho, supra note 242, at 7 tbl.3.
245 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211, 301 307 (2000 & Supp. 2004). The Bayh-Dole Act allows
scientists to seek patents for discoveries that arise from federally funded research
projects.
246 See Cho, supra note 242, at 6, 8; Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test:
The Pitfalls of Patents Are Illustrated by the Case of Haemochromatosis, 415 NATURE
577 (2002).
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legal privilege for independent researchers to overcome the barriers of
patents and thus pursue follow-on innovations.
D. THE INFORMAL RESEARCH EXCEPTION IS NOT DEPENDABLE
Faced with the problems demonstrated above, the United States'
academic community now heavily relies on the informal research
exception. It is informal in the sense that it is not enshrined in legal
doctrine, but in reality forbearance does exist among biomedical patentees
for infringement by academics. Although not recognized by black-letter
law, this exception has social foundations in the biomedical sector and
thus would not be easy to eliminate.
The primary basis of support for this de facto exemption is the
desire of patent owners to maintain close relationships with the scientific
community. Universities do not sue each other for patent infringement,
and they also hate to be sued. Turning to the scenario between academia
and industry, the biomedical business is a science-based industry and thus
greatly dependent on the progress of science to spark new momentum for
industrial innovation. 247 Accordingly, enterprises in the industry tend to
keep close and friendly ties with academics. As one university technology
transfer officer described in an interview, "[T]hese firms are consumers of
technology as well. No one will talk to you if you sue. We all scratch each
others' backs. You will become an instant pariah if you sue a
university.'"248 Another respondent from the industry made the same point:
We rely on lots of outside collaborations with academic
labs. Our scientists want to feel on good terms with the
academic community. If you start suing, it breaks down the
good feeling. We give out our research tools for free,
frequently. All we ask is, if you invent anything that is
directly related to the tool, you allow us the freedom to
practice. 2
49
The inflow of technology from universities to industry takes
various forms. Companies may sponsor industry affiliates programs,
through which they can attend research group meetings and get early
knowledge of research progress. They also attain closer partnerships
through individualized research projects, which are aimed at developing
specific commercial products. 250 Another important connection is
interpersonal relations. Technology companies or their research
departments are often located close to major universities. They recruit a
247 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 102, at 883-84, 904-08, 915.
241 Walsh et al., supra note 141, at 325.
249 Id. at 326.
250 Cristina Weschler, Note, The Informal Experimental Use Exception: University
Research After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1536, 1557 (2004).
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well-educated workforce and invite professors from nearby universities to
be their consultants. As a matter of fact, a large number of biotechnology
firms are spin-offs from universities, and leading professors may hold top
management positions at these firms. 2 51 The universities may also own
equity in such firms. All of these connections enhance personal contacts
and information exchange. New scientific progress and business
opportunities can circulate conveniently through personal networks and
frequent interactions, particularly in the technology clusters that have
emerged around universities.
252
Another reason for the patent owners' forbearance is the high cost
and few payoffs of infringement litigation coupled with the minimal
payoffs it yields. In addition to the considerable expenses of attorneys
fees, plaintiffs risk having their patents invalidated in court. 253 Research
tools are, by definition, not present in the final outcomes of research and
commercialization. The employment of patented research tools during
development processes would thus be difficult to discern, so long as the
end products and publication of the scientific findings gave no indication
of the unauthorized use. 2 54 In other words, the information costs of
detecting infringement have escalated. The infringement could remain
under the radar of patentees. In the same vein, since research tools are not
embodied in the end products that draw profits from the market, it may be
difficult for plaintiffs to prove substantial damages in court, which may
further deter infringement lawsuits.
255
Still, the informal research exception is not robust and
comprehensive enough to satisfy independent researchers. First of all, the
informal exception is usually applied only to non-commercial research,
whether conducted in academia or industry.256 There have already been
cases like Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. ,257 where businesses
doing follow-on research and commercialization were brought to court by
patentees. In Integra, the pharmaceutical company Merck commissioned
the Scripps Institute to perform drug development. Merck also provided
the Institute with Integra's patented compound as a primary drug
candidate. Although the final product that was developed did not comprise
embodiments of the patented invention, Integra nevertheless sued Merck
and Scripps for infringement during the development period. This case
251 Id. at 1557-58.
252 Id. at 1558 59.
253 Walsh et al., supra note 141, at 328.
254 See Weschler, supra note 250, at 1562.
255 Id. at 1563.
256 Id. at 1564; see also Walsh et al., supra note 141, at 326-27.
257 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
53
WANG: BIOMEDICAL UPSTREAM PATENTING AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
10 YALE J.L. & TECH 251 (2008)
clearly illustrates that the high costs and low returns of litigation 25 are not
dependable insulation from infringement lawsuits.
Second, the informal exception is vulnerable. A small number of
incidents may cause it to collapse. The exception is, in effect, a social
norm within the biomedical sector, deriving from the old norm that
underlay the ideal of open science. The traditional scientific norm is now
retreating; further, it is being progressively undermined by laws that
govern patents and technology transfers, such as the Bayh-Dole Act. 2 59 In
addition, the informal exception is not bolstered by patent law; rather, it
relies, at least in part, on the benign self-restraint of patent owners in the
biomedical field.
Accordingly, a "butterfly effect" may attack and substantially
restrain the informal exception. 260 In today's litigious society, universities
face an increasing number of legal disputes. Handling legal problems has
become one of the main tasks for university administrators. Among the
various types of disputes, litigation imposes the most pressure on
universities because of its visibility and formalities. Universities and other
research institutions thus remain on watch for potential legal liabilities.
261
To deal with this concern, universities frequently establish legal
compliance and risk management departments.
262
251 In the Integra case, the Federal Circuit reversed a $15 million damage award for
reasonable royalties. The court emphasized that when assessing damages for research
tool infringement, the lower court must factor in the scientific and economic risks that
Merck sustained during the development process, the prospect of the drug being
released on the hypothetical license negotiation date, the point at which the patented
research tool was utilized in the development process, and the number of patent
licenses necessary for developing the drug. See Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd. v. Merck
KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 869 72 (2003).
259 See Rai, supra note 26, at 109-15.
260 The Butterfly effect, also called "sensitive dependence on initial conditions," is a term
central to chaos theory. It denotes the large variations that small changes in an initial
condition can bring about in the long-term behavior of a nonlinear dynamical system.
Wikipedia, Butterfly Effect, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butterflyeffect (last visited
Apr. 22, 2008); see also Chaos & Fractals The Butterfly Effect,
http://www.pha.jhu.edu/-1db/seminar/butterfly.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2008);
Wolfram Mathworld Butterfly Effect, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Butterfly
Effect.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
261 See 1 WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
MAKING 3 9, 93 95 (4th ed. 2006); RICHARD D. STRAHAN & L. CHARLES TURNER,
THE COURTS AND THE SCHOOLS: THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR AND LEGAL RISK
MANAGEMENT TODAY xiii xv (1987).
262 The Risk Management Department at Stanford University begins its mission statement
with the following: "For humanitarian, social, legal, and financial reasons, the
University will make every reasonable effort to protect the health and safety of
members of the community and the public. .. ." Stanford University Risk Management
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If fortuitous but salient incidents of patent enforcement arise
against academic institutions, they would likely ignite the latent fears of
university management about patent litigation, thus resulting in more
stringent limitations on the use of patented research tools and, as a
consequence, triggering a sudden contraction in use of the informal
research exception. 263 Vigorous enforcement of patents could come from
outsiders of the biomedical sector, who do not perform continuous
research in the field and therefore have few (or no) incentives to retain
close relations with academic researchers. 264 An example of this problem
comes from DuPont. The company has phased out its research in
molecular biology and taken a strong position on patent licensing and
implementation. In addition to its full-fledged reach-through requirements
for the license of Cre-lox technology,265 it also aggressively enforced the
OncoMouse patent that it exclusively licensed from Harvard College.
Universities were accused of infringement for not vigorously abiding by
the exact terms in the memorandum of understanding, which DuPont and
the NIH agreed to for the purpose of affording a free license to NIH-
funded research.266 Moreover, DuPont construed the claims of the patent
so broadly so as to embrace all types of cancer-prone mice, whether they
were made by inserting oncogenes or by any other means. Many scientists
considered this assertion to be baseless and overpowering.
267
In addition, there is a group of patent licensing companies, dubbed
the "patent trolls," which are already active in the electronic and internet
industries. The term "patent troll" was coined by Peter Detkin, a former
assistant general counsel of Intel, to denote those firms that, in his words,
"tr[y] to make a lot of money of a patent that they are not practicing and
have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced., 268 Most
patent trolls do not manufacture any products. Quite a number of them
neither engage in research nor sponsor innovative campaigns. The primary
line of their business is patent licensing, which is supported by their potent
See also Finance Division, Tufts University: Policy on Regulatory Compliance,
available at http:/ /fmance.tufts.edu/policies/poli regcompliance.php; The Office of
Compliance, University of Southern California: Compliance Plan Mission Statement,
available at http://www.usc.edu/admin/compliance/whatsnew.html; Research at
Indiana University Overview of Research Compliance on the IUB and Regional
Campuses, available at http://www.research.indiana.edu/rschcomp/over.html.
263 See Weschler, supra note 250, at 1566-68.
264 Rai, supra note 26, at 85 (discussing the work of Robert Ellickson on law and social
norms); Walsh et al., supra note 141, at 325-26.
265 See supra text accompanying notes 234-235.
266 Walsh et al., supra note 141, at 326; Gareth Cook, Researchers Criticize Terms of
Cancer-Mice Use, BOSTON GLOBE, May 31, 2002, at Al.
267 Cook, supra note 266.
268Brenda Sandburg, Battling the Patent Trolls, THE RECORDER, July 30, 2001 (on file
with author).
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willingness to file infringement lawsuits in court. 2 6 9 Once patent trolls
encroach on the biomedical sector, these licensing companies will have
nothing to lose when they bring infringement litigation against academic
institutions and researchers. They do not share the incentives for
maintaining a cordial relationship with the scientific community.
Lastly, scientific competition is as fierce as the race in the
marketplace, and thus is another potential source of assertive patent
enforcement. In order to prevail in the race for scientific discoveries or to
defend their own intellectual beliefs, it is possible for scientists to use
patents to keep their colleagues away from their research topics, or to
prevent contending theories from attacking their basic viewpoints and
assumptions. 27  From this perspective, it would not be a surprise if
someday a research scientist filed infringement litigation against academic
institutions that assume the scientist's tolerance for academic use of the
patents and are further engaged in competing research. These instances
and possibilities clearly elucidate the vulnerability of the informal research
exception. Independent researchers need a reliable way to acquire research
tools efficiently and lawfully. Acknowledging the necessity, this Article
will focus in the following parts on the search for an adequate resolution
to deal with the blockage problems caused by upstream patent
proliferation.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR THE PATENT PROLIFERATION DILEMMA
There are two basic approaches to dealing with the blockage
problem posed by upstream patent proliferation. Modifying the
patentability requirements of utility, nonobviousness, enablement, and
written description in order to make them more stringent is one way to
confront this problem. This approach may have a substantial and unique
impact on upstream patents. On this front, the Federal Circuit has made
heavy use of the written description requirement to control the scope of
biomedical patents. In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly
& Co.,271 the court confined the claim scope of molecular biological
materials, such as DNAs or proteins, to those for which the chemical
sequences or common structure features are already recited or represented
in the patent specifications. In Searle,272 the Federal Circuit again used the
written description requirement, this time to invalidate reach-through
2 69See id.; Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Comment, Patent Investment Trusts: Let s Build a Pit to
Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 374-78 (2005); IPrex Intellectual
Property Solutions et al., Patent Terrorism Terror of the Intangibles, June 27, 2006,
ipFrontline.com, http://www.ipfrontline.com/printtemplate.asp?id- 11605.
270 See Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1057 59; Rai, supra note 26, at 124.
271 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
272 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For more
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claims, so as to prevent upstream patents from preoccupying after-arising
innovations downstream. In regards to the utility requirement, the Federal
Circuit made clear in In re Fisher273 that general use which is common to
the genus that the invention belongs to is not a substantial and specific use
as required by patent law. Accordingly, the court invalidated EST
patents.274 These cases exemplify the importance of the patentability
standards in addressing the problems caused by proliferation.
Nevertheless, given the existence and prosperity of the
biotechnology industry and its dependence on patent protection, perhaps
upstream patents will not fade from the horizon of biomedicine after all.
Assuming this to be true, this Article will instead concentrate on another
approach to tackling the problem of upstream patent proliferation: limiting
the exclusive rights of upstream patents and facilitating their license. The
following sections will investigate such solutions, including the creation of
license-facilitating institutions and providing exemptions for patent rights.
A. CROSS LICENSING, PATENT POOLS, AND OTHER COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
ORGANIZATION
Some commentators believe that license-facilitating institutions
may ease the problems caused by upstream patents. These scholars appeal
to experiences in other industries and to certain public data pools that
currently exist in the biomedical sector. In actuality, there are only two
major data pools that exist: the Human Genome Project and the SNP
Consortium. 275 Biomedical data pools are not just few in number; they
also emerge only when upstream patents pose a keen threat to the core
interest of a class of businesses, thus making a collective defense
desirable. In addition, public interest institutions such as the NIH and the
Wellcome Trust, a charitable nonprofit organization, also played a critical
role in catalyzing the aforementioned data pools. Because of these
limitations, data pooling does not currently provide the comprehensive
resolution necessary for tackling blockage problems.
The more profound difficulty of this approach lies in the stringent
preconditions required for license-facilitating institutions to take shape.
Since these conditions, as explained below, rarely exist in the biomedical
sector, the chances are low that facilitative institutions would be able to
ease the negative effects that blockage inflicts on biomedical research.
Even if individual coordination or cross licensing were possible, these
piecemeal solutions do not have the capacity to settle the problem as a
whole.
273 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
274 See supra Subsection 111.B.7 for a more detailed discussion.
275See supra text accompanying notes 176-184 for brief descriptions of the Human
Genome Project and the SNP Consortium.
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1. Precondition I: A Few Firms in a Repeated Game
Biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries are fragmented
industries with a low concentration of market.276 Although both industries
have experienced many mergers and acquisitions, the degree of market
concentration remains moderate. According to a combined survey
conducted across the two industries, the ten largest companies accounted
277for only half of the combined sales revenue in 2002. The relatively large
number of key players and the diffusion of market shares make it more
difficult for companies to come to terms with one another, thus
aggravating the problem of collective action and increasing the chances of
entire arrangements breaking down, as one or two participants retreat.278
The hostility bred among competitors in the marketplace is another
hurdle to their cooperation. Companies engaged in the same line of
business act as enemies, fighting for similar clusters of customers. Only in
a repeated game with very limited players-typically an oligopolistic
market where no player can defeat other contenders and where harsh
fighting decrease profits and results in a zero-sum competition-will
competitors learn to cooperate with each other over time, in order to reach
agreements that diminish common concerns.279
2. Precondition II: Sharing Aligned Goals and Interests
Furthermore, the industries where license-facilitating mechanisms
come forward often possess internally shared goals and aligned interests.
Businesses in such industries may use interrelated manufacturing
processes or produce largely homogeneous products.280 These similarities
foster common interests between these businesses, putting them at risk for
encountering mutual patent interlocking. The resemblance among
competitors also brings about complementary patents in the same
industries, which empowers competitors to release each other from the
web of interlocking patents by cross licensing or through other types of
276ALFONSO GAMBARDELLAET AL., GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS IN PHARMACEUTICALS: A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 25-26 (2000); ROBINSON, supra note 124, at 26 (quoting
statement of Dr. P. Roy Vagelos, former Chairman and CEO of Merck).
277Patricia M. Danzon et al., Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical and Biotech
Industries 1 (Sept. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Organizational
Economics of Health Care Conference 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-468301.
27 Rochelle K. Seide & Michelle LeCointe, Just Say 'No' to Patent Pooling for
Genomics, GENOMEWEB DAILY NEWS, July 13, 2001,
http://www.genomeweb.com/news/ 117309-1 .htm.
279See Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model qf
Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 218-20 (1994); Rai, supra note 26,
at 85-86.
280 See Seide & LeCointe, supra note 278.
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cooperation. Common interests like these have been a critical factor in
encouraging patent cooperation among competitors.
In the biomedical sector, however, the market is highly dispersed
and fragmented. For example, medicines for two different types of
diseases cannot be considered as part of the same market. The rapid
progress of science and the diverse approaches to investigation also make
it difficult to determine which patents should be pooled or shared. 28 1 As
discussed in Subsection III.B.3, members of this sector have
heterogeneous interests and agendas. Upstream academics and
biotechnology companies prefer exclusive licenses, seeking to share the
rent that a downstream blockbuster product might bring about, while
downstream pharmaceutical firms prefer to keep the rent to themselves,
opting for a more open licensing scheme in order to have more
opportunities to discover lucrative products.
The divergence of goals and interests between businesses, on the
one hand, and academic institutions and government agencies on the other,
is even greater. The primary goal of academics is scientific achievement.
They desire speedy access to useful research tools, whenever such tools
are needed. Government agencies such as the NIH shoulder the mission of
promoting the progress of science, thus preferring an open exchange of
scientific data, as illustrated by the establishment of a data pool in the
Human Genome Project. Private businesses, in contrast, are focused on
maximizing their profits so as to achieve the best interest of their
shareholders.
3. Precondition III: The Impetus to Overcome High Costs
Patent pools and other collective rights organizations require high
costs to construct. This implicates hard work in the form of negotiation,
persuasion, consensus building, and agreement drafting, not to mention the
more difficult tasks of patent evaluation and royalty division.28 2 This high
threshold is aggravated by the problem of collective action. The firm who
puts forth the initiative for a cooperative enterprise bears most of the costs,
but enjoys no more benefit than any other participant with a similarly
sized business operation and patent portfolio.
Consequently, endless patent fights may not be sufficient to
prompt the creation of a license-facilitating institution. They usually
require something of even greater magnitude to outweigh the enormous
costs. An industry-wide pool that arose in the airplane industry can best
illustrate this situation. The Wright brothers' patent for the stabilizing and
steering system of aircrafts is the foundation upon which airplanes are
281 Id.
282Robert P Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions. The Case of
Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY, supra note 143, at 123, 144-45.
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built,283 but Glenn Curtiss developed the flap configuration that
implements this system much more effectively. Even before Curtiss
secured a patent for his invention, most manufacturers had been using the
technology in aircraft production.2 84 One of the Wright brothers and his
successor-the Wright-Martin Company-initiated and finally won an
infringement litigation over the Curtiss technology. In the aftermath,
Curtiss avoided the consequences of the decision by continuously making
small changes to his configuration. On the other hand, the Wright-Martin
Company charged as much as $1000 per airplane for its patent, and
threatened to sue those manufacturers that were unwilling to accept that
term.285 What followed was a deadlock that jammed the entire airplane
industry. When World War I erupted, this situation prompted concern
from the armed forces. It was not until Congress threatened to expropriate
the patent that the Wright-Martin Company conceded it to a patent pool,
open to every firm in the airplane industry.
286
Besides governmental intervention, the critical forces that have
turned patent cooperation into a reality include pressure from potential
licensees, enormous projects beyond the reach of a single competitor, and
acute common threats to competitors. A telling example of pressure from
potential licensees arose in the industry for swimming pool cleaners.
287
Landon Inc. and Robert Pace held interlocking patents on swimming pool
cleaners. No manufacturer could produce the cleaner without licenses
from both of them. When Landon first sought to license, manufacturers
were not interested without the co-presence of the Pace license. 288 To cope
with the resulting deadlock, Landon and Pace set up a patent pool. Pace
assigned his patent to Landon, but kept a royalty-free right to use both
patents. According to a fixed formula, they shared royalties from outgoing
licenses.
289
MPEG-2 and DVD patent pools are good examples of projects
beyond the reach of a single competitor. These patent pools are auxiliary
to the standard setting of digital storage formats. 29 For standard setting to
succeed, the acceptance of manufacturers in related product markets is
key. For digital storage, this involves multiple industries, including
computer and consumer electronics manufacturers and audio/video
213 Merges & Nelson, supra note 102, at 890.
214George Bittlingmayer, Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent Agreement,
31 J.L. &ECON. 227, 231 (1988).
285 Id. at 231-32.
216 Id. at 232; see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 102, at 891.
287 See generally Merges, supra note 282, at 143 n.79.
288 International Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1964).
289 id.
290 Merges, supra note 282, at 151.
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content providers. 291 The founders of the MPEG-2 and DVD patent pools
thus solicited companies that have large market shares in different
industries to join the project, together developing a new protocol for
digital storage devices. 292 When the new formats were stipulated, the
project participants were principal advocates for these technologies. They
used their influence in the industries to promote products of the new
protocols, thus expanding market shares and consumer acceptance of the
novel technologies, as they strove to advance the formats to be the
prevalent industrial standards. At the same time, each patent that was
perceived in the development process as necessary for implementing the
protocols was pooled into a package to provide one-stop licensing, which
was offered publicly to every interested manufacturer. 293 The royalty rate
of this package was kept at a reasonable level in order to secure pervasive
acceptance. 294 Projects such as these overwhelm the capabilities of any
single business and therefore are a frequent impetus to collaboration
among competitors.
295
For the third scenario, where acute common threats to competitors
are present, the SNP Consortium fits in. SNPs are a perfect source for
exploring the genetic bases of human disorders. 296 Those who engage in
biomedical research need SNP data in order to keep their studies at the
cutting edge. In addition, SNP information is also the foundation for
personalized medicine. If the connection between side effects of certain
types of compounds and specific SNPs can be established, it could save a
fortune for pharmaceutical companies by significantly reducing the
amount of time and money required for clinical trials. 297 To make this
happen, drug companies need easy access to a SNP map that is annotated
with this type of information and that is officially recognized by both the
scientific community and a regulatory agency, namely the FDA.298
291 For products and services that are implicated by the two technologies, see JEANNE
CLARK ET AL., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO
THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 13-15 (2000), available at
http: //www.uspto.gov /web/ offices/ pac/ dapp/ opla/patentpool.pdf.
292 For the membership of these patent pools, see id
293 Id.
294 In both cases, the patent pools charged only a relatively small fraction of the total
manufacturing costs for the patent package. Merges, supra note 282, at 161-62.
295 Despite the necessity of cooperation, disparities between the participants' strategies
and agendas nevertheless led the ten-member DVD consortium the technology-
developing body to split into two patent pools. The split created a risk of increased
costs for the protocol and also affected its acceptance. See Merges, supra note 282, at
153.
296 Gillis, supra note 183; Genetics and Patenting, supra note 176.
297 Langreth et al., supra note 181.
291 Id.; see also Wade, supra note 183.
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Recognizing the significance of SNP maps, genomic companies
raced to secure SNP patents for the purpose of forging proprietary SNP
databases. 299 If pharmaceutical companies do not forestall the SNP
patents, genomic firms may end up controlling a great portion of the SNP
data in humans, which would give them a incredible leverage in the
biomedical sector.300 In a worse scenario, the entire sector might have to
rely on multiple private databases, with each database asking for
monopolistic rent. This situation will not only dramatically increase the
costs of biomedical research, but will also place the lifeblood of the sector
in the hands of a few genomic companies. Consequently, SNP patents
represent a common threat that confronts every pharmaceutical giant.
In addition, if SNP data is withheld by a number of genomic firms,
it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the scientific community to
complete a SNP map. Even if a SNP map is compiled, without the ability
to verify the data held secret by these firms, the map will not obtain the
recognition of the scientific community, which in turn will be fatal to its
chances of being accepted as a benchmark in clinical trials. 30 1 In order to
conserve the ideal of personalized medicine and to forestall the threat
posed by genomic firms, ten pharmaceutical giants set up the SNP
Consortium as a public domain for SNP information. With the sponsorship
of the Wellcome Trust, participating drug companies support academic
SNP research, publicly disclose genetic discoveries thus reached, and pool
these discoveries altogether to form the Consortium.
302
The SNP Consortium demonstrates the whole point made in this
section. In facing a menace to their common goals and interests,
competing pharmaceutical companies overcame high costs and created a
public data pool to preclude SNP patents and to facilitate the exchange of
scientific findings. 303 However, under circumstances that lack one of the
three preconditions discussed above, it will be arduous to establish or
sustain such a license-facilitating institution.
B. EXEMPTIONS
After the Integra decision in 2005, a disparity arose between
downstream commercialization, which is exempted in this case from
infringement liability, 30 4 and upstream research, which still depends on the
299Langreth et al., supra note 181.
300 Wade, supra note 183.
301 Id. In regard to the SNP map, this also a project that is beyond the capabilities of
individual companies and thus requires collaboration.
302 Gillis, supra note 183; Genetics and Patenting, supra note 176; Langreth et al., supra
note 181.
303 What is lacking in the SNP Consortium is a repeat game. Pharmaceutical firms may
have learned a lesson from the Human Genome Project, which contained a public
genomic database primarily maintained by the NIH and the Wellcome Trust.
304 See supra note 48.
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informal research exception for relief from patent blockages. In effect,
upstream research creates more spillover effects and positive externalities
than downstream commercialization. From this point of view, an
exemption for upstream research is indeed compelling.
1. The European Research Exception Is Not Sufficient
Major jurisdictions around the world frequently adopt a European-
style exception for research activities. This exemption originated in
Articles 27 (a) and 27(b) of the Convention for the European Patent for the
Common Market, more commonly referred to as the Community Patent
Convention (CPC). 30 5 The provisions read as follows:
The rights conferred by a Community patent shall not
extend to:
(a) acts done privately and for non-commercial
purposes;
(b) acts done for experimental purposes relating to the
subject-matter of the patented invention. 306
Although the CPC has not yet taken effect, the European Union states
have widely incorporated this exception into their national laws. As
Professor William Cornish surveyed in 1998, eleven countries adopted it
without modification, including Germany, France, and the United
307 308Kingdom.30 7 Other countries adopted it with certain variations. Since
2000, the European Council and European Commission have been
working on preparing a Council regulation to establish a community
patent system. The research exception has been incorporated into the
proposed regulation using the same language as appears in the CPC.3°9 On
the other side of the globe, Japanese patent law provides for a similar
exception. It stipulates that "[t]he effects of the patent right shall not
305 Dec. 15, 1975, 15 I.L.M. 5 (1976). These provisions originally appeared in Article 31,
until they were renumbered in the amendment of Dec. 15, 1989.
316 Id. art. 27(a)-(b).
307 William R. Cornish, Experimental Use of Patented Inventions in European
Community States, 29 INT'L. REV. INTELL. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 735, 735-36 (1998).
The other eight countries were Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Spain, and Sweden.
308 For example, Dutch patent law requires the exempted act "to be solely serving for
research on the patented subject-matter." Id. at 736. Portuguese patent law, meanwhile,
immunizes from liability only those "acts carried out exclusively for testing or
experimental purposes." Id. at 736 n.3.
309 Council Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent, art. 9(a)-(b),
Nov. 21, 2003, available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st 15/st 15086.enO3.pdf.
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extend to the working of the patent right for the purpose of experiment or
research.,3
1 0
The experimental prong as represented in CPC Article 27(b) is the
core of this exception. As interpretation of this prong has developed in
Europe, it has garnered considerable coverage. Every activity that is
intended to attain information related to the patented subject matter
qualifies as an experiment that fits into the exception. 311 For example, in
Clinical Trials I, the German Supreme Court confirmed that the sale and
distribution of medicine for proving additional medical indications was a
suitable candidate for the research exception.312 In Clinical Trials II, the
court ruled that trials in search of unknown side effects do generate
information on the patented compounds and thus also fall within the
purview of the exception. The court rejected the argument that after basic
effectiveness has been established extra testing on drugs is simply for
marketing purposes. 313 Both decisions have been commended and are
expected to be followed in other European Union states.
314
On the other hand, tests to establish the bioequivalence of generic
drugs to their brand-name counterparts yield no new information on the
drugs themselves. Most European courts have refused to invoke the
exception in this scenario. 315 Courts have also distinguished qualified
cases from unqualified ones, such as those aimed at collecting business
information, such as consumer demand for the patented product, or the
range of acceptable prices and distribution channels.
316
Another question is whether the mixed nature of an infringing
activity makes it ineligible for the research exception. In Clinical Trials I
and II, the German Supreme Court repeatedly held that the experimental
purpose could coexist safely with other purposes, including a commercial
intention, and still qualify for the research exception.317 In other words,
not only can the experiment itself be commercial in nature, but the
infringing use is also allowed to fulfill other objectives. What the
experiment needs in order to qualify for the exception, then, is a genuine
experimental purpose. It does not matter whether the experiment is
310 Mueller, supra note 5, at 39 (citing Japanese Patent Law of 1959,§ 69(1) (as amended
May 6, 1998)).
311 BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 49, at 543-44; CORNISH, supra note 48, at 29; Peter
Ruess, Accepting Exceptions?: A Comparative Approach to Experimental Use In U.S.
and German Patent Law, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 81, 100 (2006).
312 Ruess, supra note 311, at 98-99.
313 Cornish, supra note 307, at 750.
314 Id. at 751.
315 CORNISH, supra note 48, at 29 n.60.
316 Ruess, supra note 311, at 101; see also CORNISH, supra note 48, at 29 n.60. (citing
Monsanto v. Stauffer [1985] RPC 515).
317 Cornish, supra note 307, at 748-50; Ruess, supra note 311, at 98 101.
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conducted by selling samples to subjects, treating patients, or whether the
real, behind-the-scene purpose is to obtain approval for marketing.
318
Surely some country-by-country differences exist between
stipulations of this exception. Not every jurisdiction embraces the private,
non-commercial prong as provided in CPC Article 27(a). But that part is a
rather limited exemption, which applies primarily to academics doing
research, and does not have any bearing on the business world.319 In this
aspect, it is very similar to the experimental use defense in American
common law before Madey v. Duke Univeisity. 32 On the other hand, those
countries that confine the research exception to activities that "solely"
serve research or experimental goals 321 do not allow their scientists to
enjoy such latitude as discussed above.
The European-style exception does have one major shortcoming: it
excludes pure research tools from its purview. 322 This exclusion is derived
from the fact that, by definition, scientists do not intend to find anything
novel with regard to these research tools. Rather, the tools are used simply
to generate new knowledge on the targets of the research.323 Given the
problems generated by patents for this type of invention, such as delays,
costs, and occasional blockages on biomedical research, pure research
tools also need an exemption to save them from the stagnated license
system that is currently in place.
2. Certain Proposed Exemptions Are Not Sufficiently Comprehensive
American scholars have proposed various types of exemptions as
solutions for the anticommons and blockage problems. Rebecca Eisenberg
originally suggested a categorical approach, classifying research use of
patents into four categories. 324 Infringement liability is exempted when the
alleged use is aimed at verifying the validity of the patent, but it remains
intact with regard to research tool patents, in order to preserve incentives
for their inventors.32 5 As for follow-on research on the same subject as the
patent, if the end result is an improvement falling within the scope of the
original patent, no liability is imposed for using the patent during the
318 CORNISH, supra note 48, at 30. For an opposing view, see BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra
note 49, at 544.
319 CORNISH, supra note 48, at 28-29.
320 See supra text accompanying notes 39-4 1.
321 See supra note 308.
322 CORNISH, supra note 48, at 29 n.61.
323 For the definition of pure research tools and their distinction from research targets, see
supra note 38.
324 Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1074-78.
325 Id. at 1074-75, 1078.
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research.326 The utilization of the improvement is subject to the patentee's
authorization, whether or not the improvement itself receives a patent. If
through the original patent, the follow-on research identifies an alternative
way to cope with the same technical problem, a reasonable royalty for its
use in the research is required, as if a compulsory license had been
granted.327 This proposal suffers from the same deficiency as the European
research exception, that is, the exclusion of research tools, especially pure
research tools. Given the problem arising from these tools is currently one
of the central issues in the biomedical sector, a more inclusive exemption
would be preferable to this proposal.
Arti Rai, along with Professor Eisenberg, recently put forth another
proposal on this issue. 328 They believe that the NIH should undertake the
responsibility of securing the public domain in the biomedical sector.
Specifically, they suggest expanding the existing authority of the NIH to
retain patent rights arising from publicly funded research.329 They also
suggest that when the NIH "marches in" and requires the patentee to
license the patent for the purpose of achieving practical applications, such
as alleviating public health or safety concerns, or fulfilling legally required
public use, 330 the NIH's order should take effect immediately upon
issuance, rather than being held in abeyance pending exhaustion of legal
appeals. This resolution is limited and depends on the discretion of the
NIH in exercising its authority on a case-by-case basis. In the past, the
NIH has refused to exert its march-in rights, such as in the CelPro case.
33 1
Given the NIH's reluctance, to date, to use its statutory authority to
interfere with the ownership and licensing of biomedical patents, this
approach should be a last resort, for use only in the most egregious
situations.
Maureen O'Rourke suggests a fair use exception to the exclusive
rights of patents in order to settle the problem of research use.332 Modeled
after a similar exception that exists in copyright law, Professor
326 Id. at 1076-78.
327 Id. According to the definition adopted in this Article, however, research inputs that
are not embodied in the end result are research tools, including those technologies that
are used in inventing or designing around themselves.
32' Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 148, at 310-11.
329 35 U.S.C. § 202(a)-(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
331 Id. § 203.
331 Nat'l Inst. Health, Determination in the Case of Petition of CellPro, Inc., Aug. 1, 1997,
available at http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug97/nihb-Ol.htm. A search of the Westlaw
database, conducted on December 24, 2006, yielded no administrative or court
decisions in which the U.S. government was asserting march-in rights against public-
funded patentees.
332 Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REv. 1177, 1205-11 (2000).
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O'Rourke's proposal is a five-factor test for the fair use exception. The
factors are: (i) the nature of the technical advance made by the infringing
use; (ii) the purpose of the infringing use; (iii) the nature and strength of
market failures in licensing; (iv) the impact on innovation incentives and
overall social welfare; and (v) the nature of the patented invention. These
factors not only determine whether the research use will be permitted
without a relevant license, but they also determine whether or not a
reasonable royalty will still be required. In comparison to copyrights,
patents are more commodified and have less bearing on freedom of
expression. A royalty-collecting mechanism is also easier to establish for
patents. Thus, positive grounds exist for imposing royalties on already
permitted uses. On the other hand, if a use generates positive externalities,
or if in an individual case the royalty requirement inherently conflicts with
the goals of patent law, such as encouraging innovation and disclosing
claimed inventions, it would be inappropriate to allow patent owners to
stake a claim for reasonable royalties.
On balance, the fair use exception as proposed above is highly fact
dependent. Furthermore, with five convoluted factors to consider and two
rounds of judgment-freedom of operation and royalty-this proposal is
full of ambiguity and uncertainty. It is difficult to predict outcomes when
applying this exception to real-life scenarios. In the realm of biomedical
research, factor (ii) counts against commercial research,333 while factor
(iii) may weigh in favor of research use under the status quo. But if courts
think of factor (iii) as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did in
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.,334 where the court ruled that
as long as there is a channel for securing voluntary licenses, the
unauthorized use will not privileged, then this factor will turn against
research use.
Factor (iv) is the most important, yet also the most unpredictable
factor in the fair use proposal. Research tools provide a good illustration.
An exemption for research use will erode the primary market for research
tools and adversely impinge upon the incentives for their innovation.
Meanwhile, research activities have significant spillover effects and are
now suffering from stagnated license negotiations, which conversely
weighs in favor of an exemption. It is thus difficult to tell which side
factor (iv) will ultimately support.
The most unique proposal to date is from Rochelle Dreyfuss, who
contemplated an opt-in exemption.335 According to her suggestion, if
independent researchers sign a waiver in advance, thereby promising to
publish their findings instantly and abandoning the right to apply for
333 Id. at 1206.
334 60 F.3d 812 (2d Cir. 1995).
335 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting Genetic Material: A
Counter-Proposal to Richard Epstein s Steady Course, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 137, at 195, 204-08.
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patents on their discoveries, the researchers can instead receive a free pass
to use patents in their research. This exemption also seems be a highly
limited one. Scientists may be unwilling prior to their research even
beginning to rule out future possibilities for commercializing their
discoveries, just to secure this exemption. Moreover, this proposal is
intended only for scientists performing basic research for non-commercial
purposes. 336 Patents, however, are fundamental to commercial research,
which requires the exclusive rights to avoid free-riding and to preserve the
market for its outcomes. The no-patent requirement will prevent
commercial researchers from making use of this exemption. Compared to
pure academic research, commercial research makes an equally important
contribution to society and also suffers form the same blockage problem.
Although commercial researchers have more resources and a greater
willingness to negotiate licenses, upstream patentees usually ask for
various kinds of reach-through rights that downstream pharmaceutical
companies are repulsed by.337 Assuming that the quantity of patents now
involved in biomedical research is still sustainable for businesses, research
targets are, to a large extent, under the strict control of patentees, and thus
making it difficult to secure a license. 338 Therefore, commercial research
also needs an exemption in order to overcome the blockage problem.
All in all, these proposals have similar shortcomings. The scope of
the proposed exemptions is either too limited or yields unpredictable
results. One of the resolutions excludes research tools from its coverage.
Though others cover these tools, the extent of their coverage is quite
limited. The O'Rourke proposal is the most inclusive, but the boundaries
and outcomes of the fair use exemption are uncertain. Except certain for
aspects of the exemptions proposed by Eisenberg and O'Rourke, no
royalties are required for privileged use, and this feature may undermine
the incentives for innovation that the patent system is aimed at providing
in the first place. The Dreyfuss proposal excludes commercial research,
and the O'Rourke recommendation faces the same pitfall. Because of
these deficiencies, the proposed resolutions are not comprehensive enough
to deal with the blockage problem now confronting the biomedical sector.
VI. COMPULSORY LICENSES BEARING REACH-THROUGH ROYALTIES
As explained in Section IV.D, the informal research exception is
now essential for biomedical research. And with the exception being so
important and indispensable, there is no reason for it to remain informal.
Keeping it informal creates uncertainty and vulnerability to attacks from
those outside the biomedical sector. 339 A compulsory license system
336 The waiver system is designed for scientists to identify themselves as basic
researchers and opt in the exemption. Id. at 204-05.
337 See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
338 See supra Subsection 1V.C. 1 for details.
339 See supra text accompanying notes 253-263. Cf Weschler, supra note 250, at 1566-69
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charging reach-through royalties, however, could fortify the advantage of
the existing informal exception, alleviate the blockage problem, and
streamline the process of royalty negotiations.
A. THE PROPOSAL
The idea of a research exemption charging reach-through royalties
was originally proposed by Janice Mueller. 340 This Article modifies her
resolution and further elaborates on it in creating the present proposal.
Under the proposal set forth in this Article, independent researchers are
exempted from liability for employing unauthorized inputs that they
request during the course of the scientific investigation. Correspondingly,
they bear an obligation to submit royalties, as if the law automatically and
compulsively granted a license. The royalty obligation arises when their
research achieves certain outcomes or otherwise comes to an end. 341 This
royalty is determined in a reach-through way, based on the contributions
that respective research inputs make to the commercial value of the
research result. When the research yields no specific outcome, a
reasonable royalty can be assessed in the way that is currently followed by
the courts. Under this method, the amount of royalties is gauged based on
the market price of the infringing research inputs, without taking into
account the value of the downstream products that are made with these
inputs. 34
2
Compared to the normal licensing procedure, this resolution shifts
royalty negotiations from ex ante to ex post. When the payment obligation
arises at the end of the research, independent researchers must notify the
patentees whose inventions were used in order to negotiate an agreement
with those who desire royalties for the use of their invention for an
adequate amount of reimbursement. If the parties cannot reach a
consensus, the patent owners can file a lawsuit to recover royalties for the
amount as calculated by the methods outlined above.
(asserting that notwithstanding this fact, university research systems will not collapse
for lack of a formal research exemption).
340 Mueller, supra note 5, at 58-66. Katherine Strandburg has also proposed a compulsory
license system. She divides the patent term into two periods. In the first period three
to five years after the patent is initially granted the patentees retain full exclusivity
over the claimed inventions, as vested by current law. During the rest of the patent
term, however, compulsory licenses are available in order to alleviate the delays that
research tool patents may pose to follow-on innovations. See Strandburg, supra note
73, at 142-46.
34 For research that generates specific outcomes, the timing of the royalty payment can
be determined using the rule for the statutory "on-sale" bar. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(2000). For the current rule regarding use of the "on-sale" bar, see Pfaff v. Wells
Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
342 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff'd sub nom. George-Pacific Corp. v. United States
Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
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In order to keep the total amount of royalties within a reasonable
limit and to ensure a fair distribution between various patentees,
independent researchers would enjoy a counteracting right to interpleader,
which requires that all notified patentees participate in the litigation, or
else lose their claim to the royalties for good.343 In view of both preserving
the incentives for downstream innovation and assigning adequate credit to
independent researchers for the discoveries they make, a ceiling should be
placed on the total volume of royalties attributed to research inputs, to be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the royalties as a whole share
the essential feature of those that qualify for an interpleader proceeding,
which are normally intended to reach a coherent conclusion on the
attribution or distribution of a limited resource before one of the
contending claimants achieves recourse, in whole or in part, through
litigation. 344 The ceiling on royalties is nonetheless not as clearly fixed as
the boundaries of a physical asset or a specific monetary amount. Hence,
interpleader might be inapplicable to these royalties. 345 Yet considering
that defendants in a royalty litigation are confronted with a situation
similar to that of defendants in interpleader-namely, facing multiple
contending claims for a limited fund-it would be advisable to include a
clause in the patent statute to facilitate independent researchers' use of
interpleader.
The compulsory license system as outlined above would not
sabotage voluntary licensing. Rather, the automatic license is a waivable
right of independent researchers. Pursuant to mutually agreed upon terms
and conditions, independent researchers can abandon this right and pay
instead either lump-sum royalties before the research gets started, or else
divide the royalties into milestone payments made to the patentees over
the course of the research. The royalties determined by the parties can also
be calculated in a way other than the reach-through formula. The waiver
mechanism may encourage patentees to accelerate the ex ante negotiation
process and to eliminate the unnecessary requirements of reach-through
rights, in order to strike a deal with independent researchers for the
purpose of acquiring early profits. On the side of independent researchers,
pharmaceutical companies prefer paying royalties upfront. 346  This
inclination matches the incentives that the waiver mechanism generates on
the side of patentees and also promotes voluntary licensing prior to the
beginning of the research. In turn, biotechnology companies may benefit
from the timely cash flow, as their working funds run low from time to
time due to the lack of instant revenue from research tool inventions.
343 Thanks to Professor Kevin Emerson Collins for inspiring me to design a mechanism
for interpleader.
344 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 533-34 (1967); see
also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 65-66 (2005).
345 State Farm, 386 U.S. at 536.
346 See supra text accompanying note 143.
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From the waiver system there derives a practical limitation on the
resolution. To make use of patented research inputs, independent
researchers may sometimes need certain equipment, materials, or technical
guidance from the patentees. When this situation occurs, the patentees can
request a waiver of the automatic license in exchange for providing these
necessary articles or information. A mandatory transfer of these items may
amount to a taking, which according to the Constitution may only be done
for the purpose of "public use." 347 A research use, though likely to result
in great benefits to the public, may not necessarily constitute a public use.
In actuality, however, this limitation is aligned with the current practice of
biomedical research and would not be a drawback to this proposal.
Scientists usually pay for experimental equipment and chemical reagents,
securing the necessary license before they begin using the inventions
embodied in those objects.348
There is a notable difference between this proposal and Professor
Mueller's. My proposal finds it unnecessary to require independent
researchers to notify patentees of their use of the claimed research inputs
at the outset of the research.349 Upstream patentees in the biomedical
sector are usually interested in developing downstream innovations by
themselves or through their exclusive licensees so as to forge their own
blockbuster products.350 Given the concerns of independent researchers
about competition with upstream patentees in the downstream market,
requiring prior notification would not be practical for these researchers
and would drive them away from the compulsory license system. The
reluctance of independent researchers may turn the entire system into a
dead letter and reinstate the informal research exception. Although in
Mueller's plan, independent researchers do not need to reveal details of
their research in the notification, 351 this adjustment cannot effectively
eradicate the competition concerns resulting from prior notification. After
all, the last thing that an research enterprise wants is to give a signal to
competitors about its business plans before the enterprise is prepared to
carry them out on the market.
B. ANALYSIS
The primary advantage of this proposal is that it retains the use-as-
needed feature of the informal research exception. Independent
researchers can use whatever inputs they need for their research, whenever
347 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
348 Commentators used to exclude experimental equipment and chemical reagents from
the coverage of research exemption. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 5, at 58; Strandburg,
Experimental Use, supra note 73, at 131.
3 Cf Mueller, supra note 5, at 58-59.
350 See supra text accompanying notes 121 122.
351 Mueller, supra note 5, at 59.
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they have to, without prior authorization. This characteristic allows
scientists to avoid the blockages that patentees may impose on research
targets in order to control the follow-on innovation of these upstream
discoveries. By preserving the key element of the informal exception that
is currently in place, this proposal would keep possible progress that a new
exemption scheme might bring to the biomedical research community to
the least extent.
The use-as-needed feature can also help avoid the delays and
excessive costs incurred by protracted license negotiations for pure
research tools.352 At the same time, by adopting the reach-through
approach, this resolution will not diminish the royalties that are enjoyed by
patentees. In essence, the proposal simply institutes a time-shifting scheme
that postpones the royalty payment, but simultaneously streamlines the
license procedure and prevents stagnation in negotiations.
This ex post reach-through method for determining royalties
provides the parties involved with an excellent basis upon which to
estimate the real value of the research inputs. With a concrete outcome in
hand and the ability to look forward together to the future market,
independent researchers and input patentees are more likely to feel that
they are in the same boat and share similar perspectives, which is helpful
in harmonizing their heterogeneous interests. The research outcomes may
also contribute to correcting their cognitive biases and alleviating the
difficulty of assessing the value of research intermediates. 353 These virtues
will greatly reduce the chances that the breakdowns, delays, and costs of
license negotiations will continue to impact the progress of biomedical
science.
Reach-through royalties are common in contemporary licensing
practices. To date, this method for calculating reasonable royalties has not
been officially recognized by the law or the judicial system.354 By
introducing the reach-through approach into current patent law, this
proposal calibrates the amount of royalties to the actual value of the
patented research inputs utilized in individual projects. It may provide
more compensation to inventors than an upfront lump-sum royalty does
when the research inputs help to accomplish invaluable findings. This
feature also amplifies the incentives for researchers to engage in more
challenging and more fruitful investigations that are aimed at the scientific
upstream. The calibration of royalties should not be considered as an
352 For an analysis of the problems currently happening with biomedical patent licensing,
see supra Section IV.C.
353 For a discussion of the difficulties and transaction costs that are now arising in license
negotiation, see supra Subsections Il.C. 1-4.
354 Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 217; Donald R. Ware, Research Tool Patents: Judicial
Remedies, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 267, 281 82 (2002). In Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck
KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 871 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 545 U.S. 193
(2005), the Federal Circuit indicated that "this court does not opine on the applicability
of a reach-through royalty in this case."
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example of pernicious royalty stacking. The value of research inputs,
especially research tools not embodied in final products, lies primarily in
their contribution to the proceedings and the outcomes of the research.
This proposal uses the same logic as the current judicial approach to
calculating the reasonable royalties, which is based principally on the
proportion of net profits attributable to the patents at bar from the
infringing products. The quality of calibration also separates reach-
through royalties from other types of reach-through rights, which leverage
the exclusivity of upstream patents to downstream markets, enabling
patentees to control follow-on development and likely amounting to patent
misuse or antitrust violations.
355
Although the feature of ex post negotiation might make the cost of
doing upstream research appear uncertain when the research begins, the
real situation is quite the opposite. By shifting the negotiation from ex ante
to ex post, the compulsory licensing scheme is pretty much like a
distribution system, apportioning the value of innovation that is created by
the research to individual patentees. If the research does not come to any
valuable result, the contribution of individual inputs to the research would
diminish accordingly. The researchers thus do not need to worry about the
royalties that would be charged at end of the research. Even if this
arrangement did generate some degree of uncertainty, considering the high
transaction costs and difficulties in ex ante negotiations, this concern may
still be less significant.
Another virtue of the proposal is that it preserves competition. As
indicated in Section IV.D, the informal exception is vulnerable to
aggressive patent enforcement. Should the informal exception collapse,
independent research, including inventing- and designing-around, could be
sabotaged, and competition in technological innovation and downstream
products would be seriously constrained. This is not a scenario that patent
law would like to experience.
In a few cases, the Federal Circuit has acknowledged the
significance of the competition brought about by independent research.
The endeavors of inventing and designing around, which are aimed at
finding alternatives to patented inventions and competing with them, have
long been encouraged by the patent system.356 In State Industries, Inc. v.
A. 0. Smith Corp. ,357 the defendant did not successfully design around and
355 John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light qf Patent Breadth and
Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 461 (1997).
356 See, e.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Kimberly-
Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 1457-58 (Fed. Cir. 1984); CHISUM
ET AL., supra note 54, at 71.
357 751 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Westvaco Corp. v. Int'l Paper Co., 991 F.2d
735, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing State Industries with approval).
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was further held to be infringing. In explaining the reason why enhanced
damages were not adequate in this situation, the court pointed out that
[o]ne of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called
"negative incentive" to "design around" a competitor's
products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a
steady flow of innovation to the marketplace. It should not
be discouraged by punitive damage awards except in cases
where conduct is so obnoxious as clearly to call for them.
The world of competition is full of 'fair fight, " of which
this suit seems to be one.
358
In Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,359 after summarizing the famous
nine factor test for assessing the proper amount of enhanced damages,
Chief Judge Nie incorporated the competition concern into the
fundamental question of damage enhancement: the willful nature of the
infringement. 360 By looking hard at the plaintiffs side of the case
regarding the counsel opinion issue, Judge Nie allowed more leeway for
independent researchers to design or invent around. Had the defendants
requested and received a counsel opinion as to whether their new designs,
which competed with patented products, would infringe the plaintiffs'
patents, they would have avoided the punishment of enhanced damages,
assuming the opinion was not evidently incompetent and that the
defendants relied on it in good faith.36 1 Moreover, only those counsel
opinions that comment on the design at issue count towards damage
calculation. Opinions that are given before the specific design comes
forward are irrelevant to the assessment of enhanced damages. 362 Later on,
in an en banc case, the Federal Circuit continued to make clear that an
opinion from patent attorneys was not required for defendants to avoid
enhanced damages. 363 The leniency that the court demonstrated towards
designing-around indicates its appreciation for the competition that
independent research generates in the development of science and
technology.
364
358 State Industries, 751 F.2d, at 1236 (emphasis added).
359 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
361 Id. at 828 (citing Slimford Mfg., 932 F.2d at 1457 and State Industries, 751 F.2d. at
1235-36).
361 Id. at 830.
362 Id. at 829-30.
363 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2004 ) (en banc).
364 Restricting enhanced damages in designing around bears a resemblance to the
situation of contractual breaches. No punitive damages are granted for breach of
contract, except when tortious behavior is present, for which punitive damages are
available under tort law; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981). The
rationale behind this conservative attitude is the idea of efficient breach. Oftentimes,
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In addition, this proposal materializes the primary goal of the
disclosure requirement. The requirement would be in vain if independent
researchers could only read about the inventions in patent documents, but
were not allowed to examine their efficacy and validity in the real world.
Providing incentive to invent or to design around earlier inventions is one
of the main justifications for the patent system.365 Without practicing the
inventions, scientists may not be able to fully grasp their teachings and
effectively utilize the scientific breakthroughs that the inventions have
brought about. The proposal here may cure the paradox between
disclosure and exclusivity in patent law, therefore enhancing the function
of the disclosure requirement. At the same time, this proposal would not
materially decrease the incentives for new technologies and scientific
findings.
For initiatives that attempt to adjust patent protection in this way,
the greatest challenge comes for the impact on innovation incentives. This
concern, however, is not implicated in this proposal. On the whole, this
proposal will not decrease the incentive level from the status quo. Rather,
it tailors the incentives to the actual contribution the inventions make to
each individual research endeavor. Furthermore, even under the status
quo, the incentive level for biomedical research inputs is not as high as it
is in other fields. For research inputs that require additional equipment,
materials, or know-how from the patentees, independent researchers have
to obtain the patentees' cooperation. Voluntary licensing is hence the most
probable result of this scenario. For research inputs that do not need the
patentees' cooperation, independent researchers might make use of the
inputs without the knowledge of patentees. Should patentees detect such
use, the informal exception would for the most part, shield academic
researchers from patent infringement liability. Although enforcement
would occur in certain scenarios, the damages that are awarded in
infringement litigation might not be particularly munificent. For example,
in Embrex Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,366 a non-biomedical case, theFederal Circuit determined that $500,000 in direct damages was excessive
breach of contract is efficient and benign for the economy as a whole. See 3 E. ALLEN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.3, at 157 61 (3d ed. 2004). In the
same vein, specific performance is frequently unavailable as a remedy for contract
violations. Monetary damages are usually considered adequate for protecting
expectation interests; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 357, 359(1), 359(3),
ch. 16 introductory note (1981). Thus, monetary damages are the most frequent remedy
for breach of contract. The approach and rationale is analogous to the compulsory
license system, where the only remedy for the exempted research use is reasonable
royalties. Cf Epstein, supra note 228, at 175-79 (criticizing unilateral breach of
contract in light of its crippling effects).
365 See supra text accompanying note 54.
366 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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for the infringement at issue, as it occurred only at the research and
development stage.
367
The compulsory license system proposed here provides a more
fruitful alternative to the status quo. Through its time-shifting design, the
new resolution saves the costs that both parties would spend in protracted
ex ante negotiations. In the ex post negotiations created by this proposal, it
is much easier for the parties to bridge the gap between their interests and
come to an agreement on the amount of royalties that reflects the value of
the patents in individual research. In addition, incentives for innovation
come with costs.368 If there is no compulsory license or any kind of
exemption in place for research use, patentees will have the right to block
independent research through injunctive relief. Biomedical outsiders such
as DuPont and patentees of genetic tests would assertively enforce their
injunctive right and cause the fall of the informal exception.36 9 This would
give biomedical patentees a controlling position over the development of
science, decrease the competition for novel discoveries, and consequently
slow down the progress of biomedical science.
370
A common drawback to compulsory license systems is the
difficulty independent entities have in determining an appropriate license
fee for the patentees and patent users involved in specific cases.371 This
proposal, however, does not give rise to the same defect. Through its time-
shifting arrangement, this proposal mitigates the transaction costs incurred
in license deals by moving the negotiations to a later, but better time that
allows both parties to evaluate the research inputs objectively. These
features facilitate, rather that displace, voluntary negotiations. Compulsory
licenses spare independent researchers from infringement liability, and
might take away part of the incentives for these researchers to strike an
agreement with patentees. Still, this proposal sets up an obligation to
provide royalty payments at the end of the research. The clear stipulation
of such payments would let the informal research exception fade away and
thus boost scientists' willingness to negotiate royalties-a quality of this
proposal that is unique in the realm of compulsory license systems.
C. OBSTACLES IN INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW
The proposed resolution does not face much difficulty fitting in
with U.S. patent laws. The condition is nonetheless quite different in the
international arena. The compulsory license system may encounter legal
367 Id. at 1340-50.
368 See supra text accompanying notes 65, 67.
369 See supra text accompanying notes 264-267.
370 For the negative impact of restricting competition on scientific progress, see supra
Subsections 111.B.4-5, and Section IV.C.
371 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 228, at 177-78.
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372obstacles in the TRIPS Agreement of the WTO, an international
intellectual property agreement with comprehensive membership and an
effective enforcement mechanism.373 The agreement lays out extensive
patent protection requirements for WTO members and contains several
impediments to solutions similar to this proposal.374
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement requires that patents shall be
available for inventions in all fields of technology except for, inter alia,
"plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological
processes for [their] reproduction . .. other than . . .microbiological
processes." 375 Though the proviso originates from Article 53(b) of the
European Patent Convention (EPC), which excludes "plant and animal
varieties" from its subject matter, the disparity between the above
language arguably allows for a reading of the TRIPS Agreement that
excludes something more than "plant and animal varieties" from the list of
subject matters for which patents have to be available in member
economies. 3 76 Even so, it is still unclear whether this proviso applies to
biomedical upstream inventions, which seldom, if ever, cover a whole
animal.377 Nonetheless, given the fact that upstream inventions such as
DNA sequences are usually treated as chemical compounds in the patent
offices of WTO members, perhaps this proviso would not stretch so far as
372 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, available at
http://www.wto. org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS].
373 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L.
275, 276-77 (1997).
374 Professor Mueller downplays this problem, only mentioning the requisite condition of
bargaining breakdowns for compulsory licenses. See Mueller, supra note 5, at 58 n.283
(referring to TRIPS Art. 3 1(b)). She found her proposal to be in compliance with that
limitation. Id.
375 TRIPS art. 27(3)(b).
376 For similar views, see Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement in the Field
of Patent Law, in FROM GATT To TRIPS THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 160, 184-85 (Friedrich-Karl Beier &
Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996).
377 There is still no settled definition in patent law for "microorganisms," an exception to
this proviso. As construed in some member economies, the term denotes any cellular
life form and sub-cellular biological elements. It can also be interpreted as simply
embracing "bacteria, fungi, algae, protozoa or viruses." CARLOS M CORREA,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 67 68 (2000). In its patent examination
guidelines, the Japanese Patent Office adopted a third definition that includes "yeasts,
molds, mushrooms, bacteria, actinomyces, unicellular algae, virus, protozoa, etc. and
further includes undifferentiated animal or plant cells as well as animal or plant tissue
cultures." Provisional Translation Implementing Guidelines for Inventions in
Specific Fields, http:Hwww. jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki e/t tokkyo e/txt/bio-e-m.txt (last
visited Nov. 7, 2005) (referred to in the section "2. Microorganisms").
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to release them from the mandatory patent coverage of the TRIPS
Agreement.
37 8
The TRIPS Agreement erects extensive regulation on compulsory
licenses in Article 31. A categorical compulsory license system will
violate paragraph (a), which stipulates that "authorization of such use shall
be considered on its individual merits." 379 In other words, compulsory
licenses shall be examined and granted on a case-by-case basis.380 This
provision is meant to forestall the automatic license system, such as the
one that appears in Indian patent laws for foods and pharmaceuticals.
38 1
Accordingly, the categorical licensing system as proposed above is not
compatible with this provision.
TRIPS Article 31 is titled "Other Use Without Authorization of the
Right Holder." Footnote 7 further defines the "other use" as a "use other
than that allowed under Article 30. , , 382 From this perspective, Article 30
seems to be another possible ground for this proposal. Article 30 is a very
vague provision governing various kinds of exceptions found in domestic
patent laws. The core of this Article is a three-part test, which requires
domestic exceptions to be (1) "limited exceptions"; (2) "not unreasonably
conflict[ing] with a normal exploitation of the patent"; and (3) "not
unreasonably prejudic[ing] the legitimate interests of the patent owner,
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties."
383
According to the interpretation handed down in the panel report of
Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case384 -the only WTO dispute
settlement decision thus far on Article 30-for an exception to be limited,
it must be "only a narrow curtailment of the legal rights" bestowed on
patentees. 385 As a result, there have to be significant limitations and tight
boundaries on each exception to exclusive patent rights. It is hard to
discern whether or not the all-inclusive proposal is narrow enough. On the
one hand, it is confined to research and commercialization only. On the
other hand, all research inputs are subsumed to the comprehensive scheme
378 Charles R. McManis, Patenting Genetic Products and Processes: A TRIPS
Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra
note 137, at 79, 85 93; Rai, Reply, supra note 161, at 711.
37' TRIPS art. 3 1(a).
380 See CORREA, supra note 377, at 93.
381 JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 322 33 (2001) (arguing that the automatic feature only exists on the face
of the law, not in actual practice).
382 TRIPS art. 31 n.7.
383 TRIPS art. 30.
384 Panel Report, Canada Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS 114/R
T 7.69 (Mar. 17, 2000), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/ 114R.DOC.
385 Id. T 7.44.
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of compulsory licensing, though compensation from reach-through
royalties.
For the second prong of the test, a qualified exception must not
affect the right of the patentees to exclude "competition that could detract
significantly from the economic returns anticipated from a patent's grant
of market exclusivity." 386 If the emphasis here is on the ability to control
the market, given the fact that research use is the primary market for
research tools, no matter how rewarding the royalties would be, the
resolution will fail this part of the test. Specifically, failure will result
because the resolution opens up the opportunity for independent
researchers to break away from patentees and make use of the claimed
inventions on their own.
Finally, for the third prong of the test, the panel mentioned in
dictum that "both society and the scientist have a 'legitimate interest' in
using the patent disclosure to support the advance of science and
technology." 387 Since one merit of this proposal is that it makes full use of
technical disclosure in patents to facilitate the development of biomedical
science, it might pass the last prong. The three-part test, however, is a
cumulative criterion. For a specific exception to survive the test, it must
satisfy each of the three prongs.
In summary, it is hard to tell whether or not this proposal will
fulfill the three-part test embedded in Article 30. From a systemic point of
view, however, if Article 30 is read to provide a justification for
compulsory license schemes, the twelve paragraphs of restrictions on the
same schemes in Article 31 will turn out to be meaningless. Consequently,
although this proposal is an adequate resolution for the current problems
caused by upstream patent proliferation, there may be no room for it in the
TRIPS Agreement.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article identifies deficiencies of existing patent laws in the
realm of biomedical science and provides a viable resolution for the
problems that arise as a result. A compulsory license system charging
reach-through royalties is a desirable approach for coping with the
blockage problems created by the proliferation of upstream biomedical
patents. Nevertheless, the proposed resolution would be frustrated by the
TRIPS Agreement. This dilemma demonstrates the rigidity of existing
patent systems, both domestically and internationally. At the national
level, this proposal faces a difficult fight against the biotechnology
industry, a group of upstream patent owners.388 At the international level,
386 Id. 7.55.
387 Id. 7.69.
388 A patent reform bill seeking to decrease the strength of patent protection has failed at
least twice in Congress, but was reintroduced in 2007. John Bringardner, Problems
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the proposed transformation might be even tougher. Judging by the past
experiences of deliberation on amendments to the TRIPS Agreement,
389
the task is very difficult and protracted, even for issues possessing a high
consensus among member economies.
Another possible way of fulfilling the resolution is re-construing
Article 30. At the moment, however, the WTO dispute settlement system
is under fire for its alleged over-aggressiveness. 390 Thus, it would be
advisable for the Organization to leave big transformations, like
reconstruing Article 30, to its decision-making branches, such as the
Ministerial Conference or the General Council. 391 These obstacles
exemplify how stubborn the existing patent system is and how its
inflexibility can harm both the system and the progress of science.
Removal of the impediments to progress and regaining the latitude for
reform thus ought to be the first step taken towards improving our patent
system.
with the Patent System: Nothing Cash Can't Cure, IP L. & Bus., Apr. 24, 2007,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp /article.jsp?id 1176887056916.
389 The only amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, Article 31bis, partially waives the
requirement of Article 31 (f) that compulsory licenses shall be predominantly used in
supplying the domestic market, allowing the export of pharmaceuticals in order to
defuse public health crises arising in member economies that lack sufficient
manufacturing capacities. TRIPS arts. 31(f), 3 ibis.
390 In fact, Robert Howse posits that the dispute settlement system has become "the most
dangerous branch." Robert Howse, The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate
Body Jurisprudence on the Nature and the Limits of the Judicial Power, in THE ROLE
OF THE JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FOR
THE WTO 11 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003).
391 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the "World Trade Court": Some
Personal Experiences as Member qf the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 605, 632 39 (2002); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann,
Tensions between the Dispute Settlement Process and the Diplomatic and Treaty-
Making Activities of the WTO, 1 WORLD TRADE REv. 301 (2002).
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